Monitoring technology proliferation: an open source methodology for generating proliferation intelligence by Green, Daniel M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
Monitoring technology proliferation: an open source
methodology for generating proliferation intelligence
Green, Daniel M.





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California @ 
94-09399 
I l~lll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll !11111111 ill! 
THESIS 
DTIC -··-
s ELECTED MA~ 81994 
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION: 
An Open Source Methodology for 
Generating Proliferation Intelligence 
by 
Daniel M. Green 
December, 1993 
Thesis Advisor: Robert E. Looney 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
... ,. ~~ - ' ~ ...... _ -- ~" -- .:....~.. - .. . 
94 3 25 086 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response. including the time for reviewing insuuction. 
searching existing data sources. gathering and maintaining the data needed. and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden. to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway. Suite 1204, Arlington. VA 22202-4302, and to 
the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
I. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DA TES COVERED 
December 1993. Master's Thesis December 1993 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE MONITORING TECHNOLOGY 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
PROLIFERATION: An Open Source Methodology for Generating 
Proliferation Intelligence 
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel M. Green 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING 
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) IO. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
I I. SUPPLEi.\1ENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This thesis develops a methodology to monitor technology proliferation. It is designed to provide 
proliferation intelligence on specific threat technologies and can be used to augment export controls or 
enhance counter proliferation initiatives. A high-tech component used to upgrade underwater mines is 
the subject of the case study developed in this thesis. This technology monitonng method exploits the 
exponentially expanding volume of open source information occurring as a result of the information 
revolution. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
Technology proliferation, proliferation intelligence, technology monitoring. rn~ 
export controls, open source intelligence, mine warfare technologies, economic 16. PRICE CODE 
intelligence, economic security, underwater mines. 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFl- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFl- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFl- 20. LIMITATION OF 
CATION OF REPORT CATION OFTiilS PAGE CATION OF ABSTRACI ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL 
~:SN /)40-Ul ~OU-:>:>W :Stam1aro t'orm ~':lo (Kev. L-o-J) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Monitoring Technology Proliferation: 
An Open Source Methodology 
for Generating Proliferation Intelligence 
by 
Daniel M. Green 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Villanova University 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1993 
Robert E. Looney, Thesis Advisor 
Thomas Bruneau, Chairman 
Department of National Security Affairs 
. ii 
ABSTRACT 
This iliesis develops a methodology to monitor technology proliferation. It is 
designed to provide proliferation intelligence on specific threat technologies and can be 
used to augment export controls or enhance counter proliferation initiatives. A high-tech 
component used to upgrade underwater mines is the subject of the case study developed 
in this thesis. This technology monitoring method exploits the exponentially expanding 
volume of open source information occurring as a result of the information revolution. 
Acceslon For \ --.-............ _ 
NTIS CRA&I ~ DTIC TAB 0 U11an:1our1c~d 0 
Justificatiori 
,___. -- __;,,:,:,:.::-· .. -·-· .......................... 
By 
................. , ................ _ ... __ ............. 




Dist Ava II aad I or Special 
A1 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. NATURE OF THE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION 
TlfREAT........................................... 2 
1. The Impact of the Geopolitical Revolution on Technology 
Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
a. Export Controls: An Effective Cold War Regime . . . . . 4 
b. The Obsolescence of Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
2. The Military-Technological Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
3. Evolution of the Global Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
C. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
D. MONITORING VS CONTROL AS A POLICY OPTION . . . . . . . 14 
E. A NEW APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY MONITORING . . . . 18 
F. SUMMARY ......................................... 20 
II. MODELING PROLIFERATION MARKETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
B. THE NATURE OF PROLIFERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
iv 
1. A Business Perspective on Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
2. The Mechanics of Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
C. THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
D. MARKET MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
1. Explanation of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
2. Levels of Analysis ..... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
E. STAGES OF Tiffi PROLIFERATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
F. FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES ... _ ............. 37 
G. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
H. CONCEPT OF CONTROL AND DEPENDENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
I. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
ill. SOURCES AND COLLECTION TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
B. OPEN SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
1. Historic Uses of Open Sources ....................... 47 
2. The Nature of Open Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
C. COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED DATABASES . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
1. Database ........................................ 51 
2. Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
3. Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
v 
D. LIMITATIONS OF COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED 
DATABASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
E. TECHNIQUES TO EXPLOIT COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED 
DATABASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
1. Searching: An Iterative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
2. When Can You Stop? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
F. SUMMARY ......................................... 67 
IV. CASE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
B. MINE WARFARE: AN APPROPRIATE CASE STUDY . . . . . . . . 69 
C. OVERVIEW OF MINE WARFARE ....................... 72 
D. MINES AND THE MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL 
REVOLUTION ...................................... 74 
E. CUSTOMIZING THE TDD PROLIFERATION MARKET 
MODEL ........................................... 76 
1. The Mine Market ................................. 77 
2. TDD Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
F. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 85 
A. IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
vi 
1. Implications of Proliferation Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
2. Implication of the Use of Open Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
B. TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
VI. BIBUcx:;RAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
vii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The threat posed by technology proliferation did not end with the Cold War. In 
fact, the potential dangers associated with the globalization of military technologies 
are heightened by an ongoing military-technological revolution. Gt'ostrategic changes 
and domestic economic consr"aints severely diminish the usefulness of traditional 
methods of countering technology proliferation (i.e., export controls). A new method is 
required, therefore, to monitor technology in order to provide some warning of 
technology's potential misuse. 
It is no longer valid to view technology proliferation as a byproduct of military 
and ideological conflict. Proliferation in the post-Cold War environment is largely a 
function of dynamic interactions between corporate actors participating in highly 
competitive technology markets. By synthesizing aspects of several international 
business theories, this thesis develops a market model based on the legal, commercial 
aspects of technology proliferation. This model provides a visual representation of the 
technology proliferation process and provide a framework for proliferation intelligence 
efforts. 
During the Cold War, open sources proved to be of limited use. Today, however, 
open sources can substantially augment traditional assets to monitor technology 
proliferation. Commercial computerized databases, because of their orientation toward 
business and industry, are open sources ideally suited to the investigation of technology 
proliferation markets. Since technology proliferation is largely a commercial exercise, 
techniques to exploit the capabilities of computerized databases can be borrowed from 
those used by corporate market analysts. 
viii 
It is impractical to monitor the proliferation patterns of every technology. 
Analysts must concentrate on "threat tech_.,,ologies," i.e., those technologies that directly 
challenge the superiority of existing military weapons and systems. This thesis uses a 
minewarfare case study to demonstrate the technology monitoring method. Mines are 
a low cost, conventional deterrent that may prove decisive to the outcome of limited 
regional or littoral warfare. The ability to upgrade existing warstock mines to 
microprocessor controlled, multiple sensor, "smart weapon" systems significantly alters 
the calculus used to plan certain military operations. The degree to which these upgrade 
kits pose a threat can be evaluated by investigating the market for these Target Detection 
Device (TDD) upgrade kits. This case study reflects the first iteration of an investigation 
of the TDD market. 
The technology monitoring method developed in this thesis can respond to 
requests for proliferation intelligence across the spectrum of warfare; from dual use 
technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to commercial or 
military technologies associated with the most mundane warfare subspecialty. A small 
team of malysts using this method and afforded adequate time, financial support, and 
the appropriate level of "command" interest, can provide unique intelligence support for 
policy makers and operational military commanders. 
ix 
I. TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION 
We will give proliferation a higher profile in our intelligence collection, 
analysis, and defense planning and ensure that our own force ;tructure and 
military planning address the potential threat from ... around the world. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
White House Press Release 
27 September 1993 
Technology proliferation poses a potential national security threat to the 
United States because it undermines the technological superiority of U.S. military 
forces. In the past, this threat was addressed through the implementation of 
multilateral export controls. In light of recent geopolitical, economic and 
technological changes, however, the utility of export controls is increasingly being 
called into question. President Clinton recently stated: 
[F]or some time the United States has imposed stringent export controls on 
many of our most competitive exports .... One reason I ran for President was 
to tailor export controls to the realities of the post Cold War world.1 
This section investigates the nature of the threat posed by technology 
proliferation, explains the changes that are leading to the obsolescence of export 
controls, and recommends a new method of monitoring technology to augment 
export controls. 
1Quoted in Secretary of Conunerce Ronald H. Brown, "Toward a 
National Export Strategy: U.S. Exports = U.S. Jobs," Trade 
Promotion Coordination Council, p. 54, 30 September 1993. 
1 
B. NATURE OF THE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION THREAT 
Technological superiority is one of eight principles supporting the National 
Military Strategy of the United States. It allows the United States to offset the 
quantitative disadvantage created by force reductions with a qualitative "high-
tech" edge.2 Superiority is a relative concept that depends not only on possessing 
and maintaining sophisticated weapons, but on preventing a potential adversary 
from obtaining qualitatively comparable systems. 
The global proliferation of technology can increase the military capabilities 
of an adversary and undermine this strategy. Technology is defined by the 
Department of Commerce as "knowledge." This knowledge is first developed into 
a product or process3 then incorporated into a military system, increasing the 
system's military capabilities. These improved capabilities, combined with 
intentions to challenge U.S. interests, constitute a discemable national security 
threat. 
This threat is composed of three main components: potentially dangerous 
technologies, potentially dangerous users, and potentially dangerous proliferation 
patterns. To address this threat effectively, policy makers must know several 
things. First, they must know which technologies can be used to upgrade military 
systems. Second, they must know who among high risk technology users have 
2Powell, Gen. Colin, National Military Strategy of the United 
States, 1993, p. 10. 
3Technology is "embodied" in the product or process. 
2 
hostile intentions toward the United States. Third, decision makers must 
understand how technologies proliferate. Answering these questions, the what, 
who, and how of technology proliferation, is complicated by several interrelated 
trends: the geopolitical revolution stemming from the end of the Cold War; the 
military technological revolution; and the continuing evolution of the global 
economy. 
1. The Impact of the Geopolitical Revolution on Technology 
Proliferation 
The threat posed by technology proliferation was addressed during the 
Cold War largely through the implementation of export controls. The problem 
was simplified by the fact that the intentions of communist countries were 
assumed to be hostile. The solution, therefore, was straightforward: prevent 
communist countries from obtaining the capabilities provided by advanced 
technology.4 
Since most countries of the industrialized West produced exportable 
technology, the effectiveness of national controls was largely dependent on the 
export policies of other nations. This problem was addressed at the international 
level by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).5 
4 In.man, B. R. and Burton, D. F., Jr., "Technology and U.S. 
National Security," p. 122, Rethinking America's Security, Allison 
and Treverton ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1992. 
5 While the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) addresses 
some specific aspects of technology control, COCOM is the only 
international nonproliferation regime designed strictly for 
3 
As its name implies, COCOM coordinated the policies of individual member 
states to restrict the export of sensitive items which " ... could contribute 
significantly to military potential and the proliferation of weapon systems, 
creating instability and international tension. "6 
COCOM developed three lists relating to military, nuclear and dual use 
technologies and products. Items on the lists were prevented from going to 
"proscribed destinations," the majority of which were communist countries. While 
the list of technologies evolved over the years, the regime reflected the static 
reality of a bi-polar international environment. 
a. Export Controls: An Effective Cold War Regime 
COCOM was an effective regime for several reasons. First, during 
the Cold War, international relations were dominated by military and ideological 
conflict between the socialist/ communist East and the democratic/ capitalist West. 
The clear and mutual threat to the industrialized nations during this East/West 
conflict encouraged cooperation and facilitated consensus on complex issues such 
as trade. Secondly, fundamental differences between free market econorriies of 
the West and centrally controlled economies of the East created natural barriers 
to trade: inconvertible currencies; lack of a legal framework for property rights 
technology. COCOMmembers are the United States, NATO allies, Japan 
and Australia. 
6Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Inventory of 




and dispute resolution; and an inadequate banking system.7 Communist 
markets could be written off by western entrepreneurs because commercial 
technology consumers existed almost exclusively in the West. There was little to 
gain from not engaging in multilateral controls and potential financial benefits 
that could be accrued from violating the export control regime were generally not 
worth the political risks. Finally, multilateral controls were successful because, 
until recently, the rest of the world was technologically dependent on the nations 
of COCOM. 
b. The Obsolescence of Export Controls 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the global forces which it 
unleashed, altered all of the conditions upon which multilateral export controls 
were based. The threat is no longer mutual or clear, free market capitalism is 
becoming the universal economic system, and convergence has destroyed the 
technological monopoly that the West previously possessed. 
International relations are no longer dominated by military 
confrontation but by economic competition. The cost/benefit calculus of export 
controls has changed in light of threats posed by slow economic growth, negative 
7 The extent to which these differences created a barrier to 
trade is only now being fully realized as former communist 
countries attempt to develop free market economies of their own. 
See Blanchard, et al., Reform in Eastern Europe, United Nations 
University, 1992, for a comprehensive overview. 
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trade balances and industrial base vulnerability.8 America's military allies are 
simultaneously economic rivals pursuing national or regional policies of economic 
expansion which are increasingly based on the development and export of high 
technology. 9 
The collapse of communism has left free market capitalism the 
dominant economic model. The restructuring that is occurring in previously 
controlled economies will break down the barriers formed by non-compatible 
economic systems creating lucrative, and competitive, new markets for high-tech 
products. Reducing export controls is viewed as mutually advantageous, helping 
the former communist countries develop while stimulating the economies of the 
industrialized nations. For example, the COCOM Cooperation Forum was 
established in 1992 in order to conduct the "progressive relaxation and elimination 
of export restrictions" on most formerly proscribed countries. 
A waning desire on the part of the western industrialized nations 
to engage in broad, coordinated export controls coincides with the decreasing 
physical ability to enforce them. The combined efforts of Western nations are no 
longer enough to control technology because traditional sources are being joined 
8Wallerstein, Mitchell B., "Controlling Dual-Use Technologies 
in the New World Order," Issues In Science and Technology, pp. 70-
77, Summer 1991. 
9It is true that this competition did exist in the Cold War, 
particularly in its latter stages. The disappearance of the Soviet 
threat, however, has removed almost all of the remaining national 
security dimension associated with broad export controls. 
6 
by other technology producers and suppliers. A greater and greater number of 
"Third World" nations, aided largely by western based multinational corporations 
(MNCs), are disregarding linear economic development theories and 
"leapfrogging" from pre-industrial societies to ones with dynamic high-tech 
segments. Brazil, India, and China are following this dualistic development 
strategy. Even poor countries, such as Indonesia, are investing billions of dollars 
into advanced technology industries in the hopes of emulating the economic 
success of the "Asian tigers."10 
2. The Military-Technological Revolution 
Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
notes that technology is advancing at "breathtaking speed" across a broad 
spectrum of disciplines including robotics, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, 
directed energy weapons, and super-miniaturization. The development of defense 
applications for these advances could, he believes, cause "changes equal to those 
brought about by gunpowder or the internal combustion engine."11 This Military 
Technological Revolution will alter existing concepts of war and profoundly affect 
the way it is waged in the future. While the benchmark for high-tech combat is 
10The "Asian tigers" are South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Shenon, Philip, "Indonesia Improves Life For Many But the 
Political Shadows Remain." The New York Times, p. A-1, 27 August 
1993. 
11Jeremiah, ADM David, "The Military and the Four Technological 
Revolutions," Defense Issues, Vol 8 No 5, p. 1, February 16, 1993. 
7 
'--------------------------------------·--·-- ---
currently Operation Desert Storm, a breakthrough in technology could result in 
the bulk obsolescence of weapons and systems employed during that conflict. 
In the past, policy makers could count on the United States leading the 
world in technology development and applications, but this assumption is no 
longer valid.12 New applications for both existing and emerging technologies are 
as likely to come from Southeast Asia as the "West" and, because of the changing 
nature of technology, may posses latent military capabilities that are not 
immediately recognizable. 
Technology, more specifically high technology,13 can be categorized 
as one of three types: military, commercial or dual use. Dual use technology has 
both military and commercial applications. The former Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, points out that it is "increasingly 
difficult to separate civilian from military technology."14 During the 1950's and 
60's, technological breakthroughs came predominantly from defense related 
research and development. Technologies became dual use as commercial 
applications were developed or "spun off' from government R&D. Radar and jet 
engines, for example, were direct spinoffs from military R&D conducted at the 
12Nelson, Richard R. and Wright, Gavin, "The Rise and Fall of 
American Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical 
Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XXX, December, 
1992. 
13The Department of Commerce defines high technology as 
products having higher ratios of R&D expenditures to shipments than 
other product groups. 
14 Inman and Burton, p. 118. 
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end of wwn. During the past 20 years, however, cutting-edge technology has 
largely originated in the commercial sector, with dual use applications being 
"spun on" to the military sector. Current advances in computers and cellular 
telephone technology15 are examples of continuing technology spin on. This 
phenomenon has tended to integrate the commercial and military technology 
sectors, increasing the number of dual use technologies and making military 
technological superiority largely dependent on commercial technological 
success.16 
The nature of modern military systems contribute to this integration. 
Along with weapons, military systems increasingly include force multipliers 
which rely heavily on dual use technologies. For example, superiority in 
command, control, communications, and intelligence systems (C41) is intimately 
linked to developments in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry. It 
is rumored that Somali warlord General Aidid was able to evade UN forces by 
using a make-shift command and control structure based on cellular telephones. 
A good illustration of how the dual use nature of technology 
complicates policy is reflected in the treatment of "critical tech .. ologies." A 
perceived dependence on foreign industry for economic and military security 
15Munro, Neil, "Pentagon Braces for New High-Technology 
Threats," Defense News, p. 3, September 6-12, 1993. 
16Alic, John, et al, Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial 
Technologies in a Changing World, Harvard Business School Press. 
pp. 7-11, Boston, 1992. 
9 
prompted the U.S. Government to identify technologies vital to the U.S. national 
interest. These were termed "critical technologies." The National Critical 
Technologies Panel17 developed a list of technologies that should "move into 
development and commercialization if the United States is to remain a world 
economic force."18 The Department of Defense, as required by law, developed 
its own list, defining it as "technologies most critical to ensuring long term 
qualitative superiority of United States weapons systems. "19 The DoD list is 
compared to the NCTP list in Table I. The comparison clearly illustrates the 
policy dilemma faced by decision makers. Because they can be used for civilian 
and military purposes, technologies commercialized for economic gain must, at 
the same time, be controlled for military security. 
17 
"The NCTP was appointed by the Director, Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP} and is required by the '90-'91 Defense 
Authorization Act to biennially report on critical technologies ... 
to increase government and industry awareness of the crucial role 
of technology in achieving national goals." 
U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Technology: Federal 
Processes for Collection and Dissemination, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-
Government Printing Office, p. l, Washington, D.C. 1992. 
18 Rep. Tim Valentine, "Critical Technology: OSTP Report," 
Congress, House, Committee on Science Space and Technoloov, 
Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness, 102nd Cong., 1st 
sess., 25 April 1991. 
19 Department of Defense Critical Technologies Plan, ES-2, 15 
March, 1991. 
10 
MJ:LJ:TARY POWER: ECONOMJ:C POWER: 
TO BE CONTROLLED TO BE COMMERCIALIZED 
- -
DBPAJl'l'llDl'l' or DBFDJSS DTIODL CRITICAL TBCBllOLOGIU P.umL 
1. CCJ1111POaite llateriala - C0811POaitea 
- Cerami.ca 
2. C01111Putational Fluid Dynaaica - Flexible C01111Puter Integrated 
ll&Dufacturing 
3. Data ruaion - Data Storage • Peripberala 
- Syatema ll&Dag-t 
'l'echDologiea 
•• Passive Senaora - Senaora IUld Signal Proceaaing 
s. Photonica - Blectronic IUld Photonic llateriala 
6. Semiconductor llateriala IUld - Micro and llf&Do-Fabrication 
Microelectronic Circuit• - C0811POaitea 
- SlectroDic and Photonic llateriala 
- Micro and Opto Blectronica 
- llaterial Syntheaia and Proceaaing 
7. Signal Proceaaing - Senaora IUld Signal Proceaaing 
8. Software Producibility - Software 
9. Air Breathing Propulaion - Aeronautic• 
10. Machine Intel/llObotica - Intelligent Proceaaing Bquipment 
- Flexible C01111Puter Integrated 
ll&Dufacturing 
11. Parallel C01111Puter Architecture - Bigh Performance COllllPUting and Networking 
12. Senaitive Radar• - Senaora IUld Signal Proceaaing 
13. Signature Control - COllllPQaitea 
u. Simlilation and Modeling - COllllPUter Simlllation IUld Modeling 
15. Weapona Syat- SDviro-t - Sigh Definition Imaging/Displays 
16. Biotechnology llateriala and - Applied and Molecular Biology 
Proceaaea - Kedical Technology 
- Pollution Minimization, 
a.aediatioo and Waste M&D&g-t 
17. Bigh SDergy/I>eDaity llateriala - C!OllllPO•itea 
- Cerami.ca 
18. Hypervelocity Project ilea - Sigh Performance Metals IUld Alloya 
19. Pulaed Power - &Dern 'l'echDologiea 
20. Superconductivity - surface '!'ranaportation TecJmol09ies 
- &Dern 'l'echDologies 







OSTP Report on Critical 
3. Evolution of the Global Economy 
A recent National Academy of Engineers report highlights two 
"mutually reinforcing trends" that have, over the past twenty years, facilitated the 
development the global economy: technological convergence among the 
industrialized nations and the integration of "formerly discrete" national 
industries.2° Corporations, responding to the new business challenges and 
opportunities posed by this global convergence and integration, are engaging in 
various activities that have changed the ways, the scope and the pace of 
technology proliferation. While international trade has substantially increased 
over the past several decades, export is only one of the ways that technology can 
be transferred. There are many corporate activities including the offset conditions 
related to foreign sales, that also contribute to proliferation. 
In the process of responding to this changed environment, the structure 
of the corporation itself has evolved. The rise of MNCs, or the emerging Global 
Technical Enterprise, indicates that governments are joined on the world stage by 
new semi-autonomous actors. In a security environment based on economic 
competition,21 governments will increasingly find themselves dependent on these 
international industries to accomplish national goals. Because, as "good corporate 
20National Academy of Engineers, National Interests in an Age 
of Global Technology, p. l, National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
1991. 
21Bergsten, Fred c., "The World Economy After the Cold War," 
Foreign Affairs, p. 97, Summer 1990. 
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citizens," loyalties must be shared, corporate practices designed to exploit 
international markets may conflict with the desires of individual host 
governments. Governments are still able to regulate, facilitate, and substantially 
influence local operations, but they are finding it increasingly difficult to control 
global operations.22 
C. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY 
Initiatives to enhance national industrial (.Ompetitiveness through the 
commercialization of high technology are taking precedence over those designed 
to counter potential military threats. For example, the Clinton administration 
recently removed national security export controls on a number of dual use 
computers and telecommunications technologies. Secretary of Commerce Ronald 
Brown stated that "80 percent of requests for export control licenses" were 
associated with these technologies. 23 
Any policy that advocates even the limited use of export controls is apt to 
be viewed as a double edged sword, hurting the initiator as much as dissuading 
the target country. The recent controls imposed against China, for sales of 
22 
"Given a technological system that is truly international, 
national governments have lost much of their ability to control 
events through investments in technology or restrictions in its 
spread." 
Alic, John A., et al., Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial 
Technologies in a Changing World, p. 12, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston Mass., 1992. 
23 Interview between Ronald Brown, Secretary of Commerce and 
commentator on CNN program "Moneyline," 29 September 1993. 
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ballistic missile technology to Pakistan, are a case in point. They are estimated 
to cost U.S. exporters half a billion dollars in lost revenue. 24 Since they are 
unilateral actions, they do not prevent China from receiving the sanctioned goods 
from other sources. 
The threat posed by technology proliferation is a function of the 
effectiveness of export controls. Since these controls are weakening, a method 
must be found to augment them. Policy alternatives, however, are constrained 
by a conservative fiscal environment. Declining budgets and political pressure 
generated by large fiscal deficits dictate that any new alternative be conducted by 
"forces in being" and not with new systems or bureaucracies. 
D. MONITORING VS CONTROL AS A POLICY OPTION 
Proliferation monitoring involves studying technology markets to identify 
the principle actors and activities associated with specific technology flows. The 
intelligence generated through the analysis of these markets can be used in 
conjunction with other methods of Indications and Warnings (l&W) to predict or 
prepare for future crises. Monitoring proliferation is well suited to a military 
security environment characterized by "instability" and nebulous threats because 
of the flexibility of the process. Resources used for technology monitoring can be 
oriented to specific technologies or actors and reoriented in a very short time. 
24Greenhouse, Steven, "One Billion in Sales of High-Tech Items 
to China Blocked," The New York Times, p. A-1, 26 August 19.:13. 
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Monitoring is a reasonable addition to export controls because it addresses the 
threat while satisfying new economic constraints on policy. It requires no 
consensus among nations, special laws, treaties or agreements, and when open 
sources are used, it does not require procurement of new hardware or software 
systems. 
There are many technology tracking/monitoring initiatives currently being 
pursued by the government. A 1990 U.S. GAO report found that six federal 
Departments and agencies account for the majority of federal technology 
monitoring efforts. 25 While a great deal of information is being collected, there 
are several obstacles hindering the effective dissemination and use of this 
information. First, interagency efforts are not coordinated. Second, technology 
databases contain both military classified and corporate proprietary information 
that preclude access to a wide variety of potential users. Third, hardware and 
software incompatibilities hinder the transfer of information even among "cleared" 
users. 
These deficiencies are so severe that "the foreign technology information 
available from federal clearinghouses is generally neither current nor specific 
25The Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
National Science Foundation. 
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enough to meet the needs of policy makers or industry representatives."26 
Government and industry officials prefer to rely instead on "private sector efforts 
.. . because they are more focused on the needs of the their clients. "27 Private 
efforts through firms such as Technology Strategic Planning Inc., however, do 
have one major drawback: they are expensive.28 
There are approximately thirty international non-government organizations 
(INGOs) and regimes concerned with proliferation issues. While they provide 
valuable worldwide coverage of many technologies, these regimes require the 
voluntary cooperation of signatories and are not universally adhered to.29 The 
utility of these nonproliferation organizations and regimes is limited in several 
other ways as well. First, existing nonproliferation methodologies focus primarily 
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.30 Advanced 





General Accounting Office, Foreign Technology: U.S. 
and Dissemination of the Results of Foreign Research, 
GAO/NSIAD-90-117, p. 2, Government Printing Office, 
D.C. 1990. 
27U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Technology: Federal 
Processes for Collection and Dissemination," pp. 2-3, Report No. 
GAO/NSIAD-92- Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1992. 
28IBID, p. 31 . 
29Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Inventory of 
International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes, June 
1993. 
300f the 31 international organizations and regimes concerned 
with proliferation, two thirds deal with weapons of mass 
destruction. 
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into the nonproliferation agenda. A "threshold" exists, therefore, below which 
technology tracking does not occur. Technological superiority implies dominance 
at all levels and across all areas of warfare. In the limited, regional conflicts 
currently envisioned by U.S. military planners and policy makers, sophisticated 
weapon systems well below the WMD threshold may hold the key to victory or 
defeat. 
Second, the sale or purchase of technologies relating WMD are highly 
regulated or outlawed by international treaty and agreement. Tracking efforts are 
geared to countering proliferation. They focus on individual governments as 
actors and emphasize the military aspect of dual use technologies. The 
preponderance of military technology proliferation, however, occurs as legitimate 
international business. A monitoring initiative that is based on corporate practices 
and maintains a business perspective can encompass both the commercial and 
military aspects of dual use technologies as well as incorporate commonly used 
corporate technology transfer strategies. 
Finally, existing technology tracking initiatives require large amounts of 
time, money and manpower. They are designed to be comprehensive because 
they provide the raw data for an array of international analysts and policy 
makers. These costs can be reduced by focusing on specific high interest 
technologies. Some technologies are related to key components of military 
systems that significantly enhance the sophistication of the system. The 
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monitoring of these individual "threat technologies" might be possible by a single 
analyst. 
E. A NEW APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY MONITORING 
An approach to technology monitoring that dips below the WMD threshold, 
incorporates the commercial aspects of military technology proliferation, and 
provides a useful tool for the individual analyst is necessary to fill the gaps 
existing in current techniques. This new monitoring method should incorporate 
several important characteristics. 
First, the method must be responsive to tasking from the national, 
operational, or tactical levels of decision making. Technology proliferation poses 
a potential problem for every level of the national security establishment. The 
monitoring method, therefore, must be decentralized and flexible enough to 
support all echelons. Since technology ''below the threshold" is ubiquitous, it is 
impossible to track it all. Only previously evaluated and prioritized "threat 
technologies" will be monitored. 
Second, the technology monitoring method must include a organized 
framework upon which the research can build. By viewing technology 
proliferation as a system, i.e., a collection of interdependent elements, a generic 
system model can be designed. This model, along with a reproducible procedure 
to allow customization of the model, provides the "guts" of the method. 
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Third, because they are not optimized for proliferation intelligence, 
tradition~~ intelligence sources must be augmented through the exploitation of 
open sources. Monitoring technology proliferation is a multi-disciplinary activity 
which requires access to a wide variety of information. Open sources are 
uniquely designed to provide this access. One open source, computerized 
commercial databases, is particularly well suited to this role. 
Fourth, the technology monitoring method must develop a technique to 
collect information from these commercial computerized databases. Since these 
databases contain such a great volume of information, means designed to extract 
only pertinent data must be developed. The business world, specifically in the 
field of competitive intelligence, currently employs the most advanced database 
search techniques. Applicable business techniques will be adapted to this method 
and augmented as necessary by "inventing" new ones. 
Finally, the technology proliferation monitoring method must facilitate 
analysis of the information collected in order to make it useful to policy makers. 
Analysis turns information into intelligence. By providing a visual representation 
of the technology proliferation market structure, the method makes it easier to 
identify the vulnerabilities of the actors and activities engaged in proliferation. 
This intelligence will highlight political, economic and/ or military options that 
may be applied in order to influence the system. 
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F. SUMMARY 
The threat posed by technology proliferation did not end with the Cold War. 
In fact, the potential dangers associated with the globalization of military 
technologies are heightened by an ongoing military-technological revolution. 
Geostrategic changes and domestic economic constraints largely invalidate the 
usefulness of traditional methods of countering proliferation (i.e., export controls). 
A new method is required, therefore, to monitor technology in order to provide 
some warning of technology's potential misuse. 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to developing a new method 
for monitoring technology proliferation. First, the theoretical foundations of the 
method will be described. Proliferation markets will be explained and the 
framework, sources, and techniques needed to engage in monitoring will be 
identified. Next, the utility of the method will be tested by monitoring a specific 
technology. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding the process and its 
potential applicability to technology proliferation in general. 
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II. MODELING PROLIFERATION MARKETS 
The day is past when a major power can control the actions of small and 
regional powers through withholding defense material or technology. There 
is always a supplier who will step in to fill the vacuum ... 
International Program Managers Handbook 1985. 
A. INTRC'DUCTION 
The West's collective Cold-War policy of communist "containment" included 
substantial provisions31 for countering technology proliferation. Today, however, 
technology proliferation (or technology diffusion), is increasingly viewed as a 
desirable commercial activity that is essential to ensuring both national economic 
security and international stability. This philosophy is reflected in two policy 
initiatives recently announced by the Clinton administration: a foreign policy of 
"enlargement,"32 and the supporting economic initiative of export promotion.33 
Other technology producers are adopting similar policies of export promotion.34 
31Multilateral export controls under the COCOM regime. 
32Friedman, Thomas L., '·Clinton's Security Aid Gives A Vision 
of Foreign Policy," The New Yq_rk Times, p. A-18, 22 September 1993. 
33Brown, Ronald H., "Toward a National Security Export 
Strategy," Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee Report to the 
U.S. Congress, September 30, 1993. 
34See Defense News, 6-12 September, 1993 for a number of 
articles concerning the commercialization of military and dual use 
technologies. 
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Section one discussed the potential threat posed by technology proliferation 
and explained the need for a new method to monitor this threat. Section two 
develops the foundations of a technology monitoring method that takes into 
account recent policy decisions. This new method addresses proliferation from 
a commercial perspective and explores the practical, business aspects of 
participation in international technology markets. By using this approach, 
decision makers will understand exactly how specific, potentially threatening 
technologies proliferate. An appreciation of the proliferation process will help 
officials to make informed decisions related to countering the proliferation threat. 
To understand the proliferation process, a simple visual representation of the 
process is needed. This visual representation (the "Big Picture") is achieved by 
modeling the commercial aspects of proliferation, i.e., proliferation markets. The 
proliferation market model establishes a foundation for proliferation intelligence 
by providing a framework for information collection and analysis. The 
proliferation market model is superior to a proliferation data base because it 
allows bits of relevant information to be organized and displayed in a logical, 
interrelated format rather than simply as a list of disassociated data. 
The accuracy of this market model is dependent on the validity of the 
theories from which it was developed. It is based on a synthesis of several 
economic theories heretofore not applied to the problem of proliferation: Michael 
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Porter's "Value System,"35 Franklin Root's international trade theories,36 and the 
logistics management theories of Magee, Copacino, and Rosenfeld.37 
B. THE NATURE OF PROLIFERATION 
Those who study proliferation have traditionally dealt with the exchange of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and associated technologies between state 
actors. One motivation for these governments to proliferate WMD sprang from 
military security and foreign policy concerns framed in terms of the East/West 
conflict. This nation-state perspective affects how the problem of proliferation is 
conceived: this state-centric view underlies the current "proliferation paradigm." 
For example, one assumption underlying this paradigm is that governments 
control the physical transfer of technology as part of their foreign policy. In other 
words, proliferation occurs as a direct result of calculated decisions by national 
governments. While this assumption was valid during the Cold War and remains 
largely true for weapons of mass destruction, it is increasingly invalid for military 
and dual use technology (including WMD technology). 
35Porter, Michael, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The 
Free Press, 1990. 
36Root, Franklin, "Entering International Markets," Handbook 
of International Business, Chapter 31. Walter and Murray ed., John 
Wiley and Sons, 1982. 
37Magee, John F., Copacino, William C., and Rosenfeld, Donald 
B., Modern Logistics Management: Integrating Marketing, 
Manufacturing and Physical Distribution, John Wiley and Sons, N. Y., 
1985. 
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Now that the Cold War is over, government motivations concerning 
technology proliferation are becoming related increasingly to economic 
development and expansion. For instance, states are now more interested in 
promoting not controlling high-tech trade. Competitiveness in high technology 
markets has become synonymous with economic growth and prosperity in both 
the developed and developing world. As historic enemies move toward the 
development and integration of market economies, national governments will no 
longer desire or be able to control the infusion and diffusion of technologies in 
their countries. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union came the end of the ideological, 
political, economic and military justification for many U.S. export controls. In this 
new environment, governments will be largely peripheral to the proliferation 
process. Technology proliferation will occur as a natural consequence of 
industrialization and modernization. Since threats to national security posed by 
technology proliferation are more nebulous than they were during the Cold War, 
it is necessary to investigate the nature of technology proliferation. 
1. A Business Perspective on Proliferation 
The revolutionary and evolutionary changes that have occurred in the 
global environment require that proliferation be analyzed at the corporate level. 
Investigation at this level-of-analysis ensures that proliferation variables associated 
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with dual use technologies, multinational corporations (MNCs),38 and technology 
threats below the Weapons of Mass Destruction threshold are taken into account. 
For instance, dual use technologies proliferate not only between governmental 
sources and users in different countries, but also between multinational 
corporations and other non-government entities operating within the same state. 
Business strategies designed to make operations globally competitive also spawn 
subtle types of technology proliferation that are invisible at the nation-state level 
of analysis. For example, because of economic sanctions preventing foreign 
investment in South Africa, U.S. owned MNCs desiring to do business there 
resorted to (legal) company-to-company licensing and distribution agreements to 
maintain some foothold in the market. These agreements grew by over 300 
percent over the past six years.39 
Corporations are not conspiring against any particular government to 
create national security vulnerabilities. Most technology proliferation is legal and 
increasingly necessary for national economic health. At worst, corporations, 
especially MNCs, are oblivious to the national security concerns of host nations. 
They rely on the nations themselves to identify practices that are inimical to 
38Corporations involved in international marketing production 
and physical distribution activities through export, licensing, 
joint venture, and fully owned subsidiary activities are referred 
to as multinational corporations. Magee, Copacino, and Rosenfeld, 
p. 200. 
39Levy, Clifford J., "A Wary Reply To South Africa's Call," The 
New York Times, p. C-1, 21 October 1993. 
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national security. At best, corporations believe that their operations are inherently 
good, from a national perspective, bolstering national security by providing the 
economic and industrial base critical to the development of a robust military 
capability. 
Currently the Clinton administration is attempting to forge post-Cold 
War strategies by dovetailing a foreign policy of "enlargement"40 with an 
economic initiative based on export promotion.41 These policies encourage both 
the opening and infusion of high technology goods into new markets, especially 
those of the former USSR and Eastern Europe. The execution of these policies 
will enhance the importance and influence of corporate actors. 
The burden of determining which technology markets may pose a 
potential threat to national security is a responsibility that multinational 
corporations neither want nor can perform. As the influence and importance of 
corporate actors increase, government must be especially sensitive to indications 
of a market changing from ''benign" to "malignant."42 These indications are more 
likely to be identified in a timely manner if the mechanics of proliferation are 
4
°Friedman, Thomas L., "Clinton's Security Aid Gives A Vision 
of Foreign Policy," The New York Times, p. A-18, 22 September 1993. 
41Bradsher, Keith, "U.S. Plans More Aid to Exports", The New 
York Times, p. C-1, 30 September 1993. 
42The most clear cut case of a benign market becoming malignant 
is in the case of Iraq where a militarily aggressive regime used 
computers transferred via legitimate trade to develop a nuclear 
weapons program. This has become the prototypical situation for 
threat technology proliferation. 
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thoroughly understood. A less than healthy appreciation of how proliferation 
occurs may lead to the improper evaluation of potential threats and the 
development of inadequate policy options to counter those threats. 
2. The Mechanics of Proliferation 
Technology proliferation results from interactions between the market 
forces of supply and demand. Demand is created by a technology user 
attempting to satisfy its own needs or desires for a product. Technology sources 
monitor their markets, identify and/ or stimulate these demands, and then attempt 
to satisfy the demand by supplying the desired technology product. 
Technology proliferation occurs when actors develop strategies and 
perform activities designed to allow technology to flow from one place to another. 
It is comprised of two distinct activities: (1) technology transfer and (2) physical 
transfer of goods. The Department of Commerce defines technology transfer as: 
The transfer of knowledge generated and developed in one place to another, 
where it is used to achieve some practical end..43 
Physical transfer is usually viewed in terms of the export/ import trade of 
technology products. The two types of transfer that make up proliferation are 
distinct. They can occur independently or concurrently depending on the type of 
agreements negotiated between actors. Both, therefore, must be incorporated into 
a monitoring method if it is to be comprehensive. 
43U. s. Department of Commerce, Office of Administration, 
Lexicon of Trade Terms, 1992. 
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C. THEORY 
As previously stated, technology poses a potential threat when high 
technology products are used to upgrade or enhance a weapon or military 
system. The degree to which these new capabilities constitute a threat can be 
assessed by investigating the international markets for these high-tech products. 
An international market is defined as "a group that has similar patterns of 
need, purchasing behavior and product use."44 Corporations that choose to 
conduct business internationally pursue strategies that allow them to become or 
remain competitive in selected markets. Competitive means, very simply, that the 
benefits of market participation exceed the costs. Benefits include showing profit, 
gaining market share in a particular product, or gaining access to foreign markets 
for a variety of products. Cost relates to expenses for such things as labor, 
materials and overhead that are required during a manufacturing process. Risk 
is the dynamic that changes the cost/benefit calculation. For example, the risk 
associated with business investments in Russia is considered high in light of 
recent unrest there. Corporations develop marketing strategies designed to 
increase benefits, limit costs and, most importantly, minimize risk. 
In practice, because international markets are so complex, in depth market 
analysis is used to develop successful strategies. Market analysis is an executive 
44Davis, Stanley, "Organization Design, " Handbook of 
International Business, Walter and Murray ed., Chapt 39 p. 14, John 
Wiley and Sons, N.Y., 1982. 
28 
---------------------------------------·-····· 
decision support tool that allows corporations to compare the sum of market 
participation costs to the sum of the benefits. Additionally, it incorporates the 
risk factors associated with market participation that change this cost/benefit 
calculus. 
Corporations attempt to analyze and understand markets in order to 
compete within them; they must investigate all internal and external aspects of 
the market. Susan Douglas and Samual Craig list 38 decision variables that 
should be evaluated with regard to cost, benefit and risk prior to market entry. 
They are grouped under five major headings: financial, technical and engineering 
feasibility, marketing, economic and legal, political and social.45 
This study of proliferation markets maintains a corporate perspective but 
ultimately has non-corporate objectives. It determines how proliferation markets 
work to identify policy options that will allow external leverage to be exerted on 
the market. Therefore, markets do not have to be evaluated from a cost, benefit, 
and risk perspective, but from the standpoint of market vulnerabilities such as 
single sources, foreign dependency, and logistics bottlenecks. Limiting the 
number of variables greatly simplifies both the nature and scope of the market 
analysis needed. 
45Douglas, Susan P. , and Craig, C. Samual, "Information for 
International Marketing Decisions," Handbook of International 
Business, Chapt 29 p. 14, Walter and Murray, ed., John Wiley and 
Sons N.Y. 1982. 
29 
Economist Michael Porter proposes that the best way to understand markets 
is to view thPi 1. as a "value system: the entire array of activities involved in a 
product's creation and use."46 In other words, to understand a product market 
sufficiently enough to be competitive (business) or to wield influence 
(government), the entire process (the sup!Jiy of raw materials, manufacturing, 
distribution channels and sales to the ultimate user) must be evaluated as an 
"interdependent system or network of activities. "47 This mutual dependence 
means that each element affects the efficiency of the system. Efforts to influence 
the system are enhanced by knowing the specific elements of the market. In the 
case of a proliferation market that has turned malignant, each element can be 
reviewed to determine what combination of leveraging optim s (political suasion, 
diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, or military strikes) can be applied 
to the system to disrupt the undesirable flow of the technology product. 
0. MARKET MODEL 
Corporate actors, industrial activities, business strategies and distribution 
flows or channels are elements common to the value systems of all technology 
markets. A model can be used to represent these generic aspects of the system. 
46Porter, p. 579. 
47This statement relates to Porter's concept of the value chain 
which he defines as "an interdependent system or network of 
activities connected by linkages. Linkages occur when the way in 
which one activity is performed affects the cost or effectiveness 
of other activities." Porter, p. 41. 
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A model organizes the system into logical relationships between elements and 
provides a simple visual representation of the complex interactions generally 
engaged in by market participants. 
The remainder of this section is a step by step examination of the underlying 
assumptions, generalizations, and logic used to develop the generic technology 
proliferation market model shown in Figure 1. The objective of the model is to 
provide the reader with a simple yet representative display of the proliferation 
market system. 
1. Explanation of the Model 
This is a model of the value system for a generic manufactured hi-tech 
product. Suppliers provide physical and technology inputs to a source where 
they are combined by manufacture into a product. The source develops a 
strategy for breaking the product into foreign markets, transferring some 
combination of physical product and/ or technology across an international border 
to an ultimate user. 
Flow diagram symbols are used to represent the actors, activities, 
strategies and flows of the market. Actors, represented as ovals, are the 
companies or corporations that execute the proliferation process. The activities, 
represented by rectangles, are the types of business practices that the actors must 
conduct in order for proliferation to occur. These activities can be broadly 
grouped into two categories: pnysical transfer and technology transfer. Strategies, 
the rounded squares, are the ways that actors develop foreign markets for their 
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product, including exporting, contracting, and investment.48 The distribution 
flows, or channels, link the elements together and are represented by the lines 
connecting actors to activities. Solid lines represent physical product flows and 
dashed lines indicate technology flows. 
2. Levels of Analysis 
This model functions at three different levels of analysis: actors, 
activities and product of the market. As discussed earlier, this proliferation 
monitoring method will investigate corporate actors and industrial activities 
relating to specific technology products. 
A technology product can be viewed at various levels of aggregation 
depending on the stage of the manufacturing process: raw materials, components, 
or systems. At the component level, the product is at a high enough level of 
Table J:J: Levels Of Analysis 
HA'UON-STATE 
ACTORS ----- CORPORATIONS 
INDIVXDOALS 
BUREAUCRATIC 
ACT::IVJ:TJ:ES -- J:RDOSTRJ:AL 
INDIVXDOAL 
48Root, pp. 31.4-31.5. 
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aggregation to allow tracking but still low enough to reflect dual use 
characteristics. Components have a narrow range of applications in contrast to 
raw materials that have a range of applications that make tracking nearly 
impossible. Components used to upgrade or enhance military systems are likely 
to have dual, or multiple uses. As the level of technology aggregation increases 
into the system level, however, applications become more specific, clarifying the 
distinction between military and commercial use. If technologies are all tracked 
at the system level, therefore, some components with military applications will 
not be monitored because they are part of a commercial system. 
IDGH 
Level of Technology 
Aggregation 
LOW 




E. STAGES OF THE PROLIFERATION PROCESS 
The model represents four stages of technology proliferation: (1) pre-
manufacturing, (2) domestic source manufacturing, (3) foreign source 
manufacturing, (4) and post-manufacturing. During the product pre-
manufacturing stage, the source receives inputs of materials and technology from 
suppliers. Materials can be raw (plastics, metals, ceramics) or semi-manufactured, 
for example microelectronic computer chips. These materials must be transferred 
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by physical means such as plane, rail, truck or ship. Technology inputs are the 
research, development, design and/or fabrication of a product. The Department 
of Commerce notes that technical "knowledge" may be: 
transferred by giving it away (technical journals, conferences, emigration of 
technical experts, technical assistance programs), industrial espionage, sale 
(patents, blueprints, industrial process) or the activities of multinational 
corporations.49 
Technology transfer is more difficult to track than physical transfer because of 
technology's ethereal nature. Blueprints, for example, can be faxed, transferred 
in a briefcase or in someone's brain. Technology transfer is not impossible to 
track, however, because it is, to a large extent, subject to international business 
laws and norms.50 
During the manufacturing stage, a source combines materials with 
technology to form a product. When both the manufacturer and the user reside 
within the same state, a product is described by the model as originating from a 
domestic manufacturing source.51 No technology proliferation occurs in the case 
of totally indigenous production, (i.e., where all materials, technology, 
manufacturing, and use occur in the same country). In practice, however, many 
49Departrnent of Commerce, Lexicon of Trade Terms. 
50Intellectual or industrial property rights. 
51The terms domestic and foreign relate to the technology user. 
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domestic manufacturing capabilities are dependent on foreign technology 
especially those in the newly industrializing nations.52 
In domestic manufacturing, foreign companies often serve as technology 
suppliers, transferring this technology in accordance with a variety of business 
agreements. Michael Broska and Thomas Ohlson provide the following list of 
agreements that contribute to technology proliferation: 
Joint production, licensed production, subcontracting in the purchasing 
country for components and spare parts, transfer of research and 
development capabilities, marketing rights, maintenance contracts for 
regional users of the weapons systems, and imports of other industrial 
goods from the weapon recipient by the supplier country.53 
These agreements, known as offsets, are becoming increasingly common as 
developing countries attempt to lessen their dependence on foreign technology 
and build an indigenous industrial base. While the term "offset" is most often 
associated with the globalization of defense industries, it is occurring across the 
technology spectrum. 
Foreign source manufacturing occurs when the process of combining 
materials and technology into a product is performed in a country other than that 
52Meier, Gerald, M., Leading Issues in International 
Development, Fifth Edition, pp. 268-273, Oxford University Press, 
1989. 
53Brzoska, Michael, and Ohlson, Thomas, Arms Transfers to the 
Third World, 1971-1985, p. 131, Oxford University Press, 1987. 
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of the ultimate user. The product must then be physically transferred during the 
post m~~acturing stage via the export/import process.54 
The fourth and final stage, post manufacturing, consists of marketing, 
selling, distributing and servicing the technology product.ss These activities are 
combined in the model under the generic headings of "Physical" and "Technology 
Transfer." The model shows physical transfer and technology transfer as parallel 
proliferation activities because in practice they often occur simultaneously. 
Physical transfer can be an extremely complicated evolution involving many 
secondary actors and activities. The field of logistics management evaluates the 
activities associated with physical transfer in terms of a physical distribution 
system. Technology transfer, an equally complex phenomenon, is a function of 
the strategies that corporations use to enter foreign markets. 
F. FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES 
Expanding from domestic to foreign markets is a complicated but 
increasingly necessary corporate process.56 The evolution of the global economy 
forces corporations to develop effective mechanisms to stretch their value chain, 
54 It is at this point in the process that governments have 
traditionally addressed technology proliferation by regulating 
exports and imports. 
55Yip, George, Total Global Strategy: Managing for Worldwide 
Competitive Advantage, Prentice Hall, 1992. 
56Taylor, Charles R., "Global Presence and Competitiveness of 
the U.S. Manufactures," Conference Board, New York, 1991. 
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a system of interdependent industrial activities,57 across international borders. 
Firms enhance their international competitiveness by developing specific foreign 
market entry strategies. Franklin Root defines these foreign market entry (modes) 
strategies as: 
Institutional arrangements that enable a company to transfer its products, 
technology, management, and other resources to a foreign country.58 
He places these strategies into three major categories: contractual, investment, and 
export. The proliferation market structure is delimited by the strategy selections 
of the corporate actors. 
In a contractual strategy, technology is transferred from a source in one 
county to a source in a second country where actual manufacture takes place. 
The technology transferred, according to Root, is usually some form of "industrial 
property rights such as patents or individual know how."59 Root also lists eight 
types of contractual strategies: licensing, franchising, technical agreements, service 
contracts, management contracts, construction or tum-key contracts, and co-
production agreements.60 Contractual strategies are less risky than direct foreign 
investment, which requires substantial capital outlays. Also, contractual strategies 
57Porter, p. 41. 
58Root, p. 31 . 4 . 
59Root, p. 31.12. 
60Root, p. 31.4-31.5. 
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avoid both import tariffs and the licensing delays associated with an export 
strategy. 
An investment strategy, like a contractual strategy, transfers technology from 
a source in one country to a source in a second country where manufacturing 
takes place. Corporations establish subsidiaries in different nations either through 
direct acquisition of a foreign firm, cold start up of a new company, or various 
joint ventures in which the multinational shares a percentage of the ownership 
with a host nation corporation. An investment strategy allows a corporation to 
exploit the competitive advantages of the host country to a greater degree than 
is possible through a contractual strategy.61 Corporations engaging in 
investment strategies are likely to transfer industrial and intellectual property 
rights, as well as manufacturing and managerial know how. 
The third foreign entry strategy, export, is also the most familiar to students 
of proliferation. Export strategies consist of physically transferring products 
across national boundaries. It can also include technology transfer such as that 
which occurs through an after-sal~s service contract. Service contracts not only 
include repair and replacement of parts but enhance the capability of a product 
through the transfer of technical "know how" or experience. The benefits of an 
export strategy depend to a great extent on the design of the distribution system 
that moves products between countries. 
61Root, 31.16. 
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G. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Products that are exported or imported are physically transferred through 
the distribution system. This system incorporates all aspects of product 
transportation and storage. Time, distance, and space are vitally important 
aspects of the physical transfer process. Unlike the technology that is transferred 
in a licensing agreement, for example, products cannot be digitized and "faxed" 
to anywhere in the world instantaneously. Many variables including a products 
size, weight, and shape must be considered when determining the most cost 
effective mode of transportation. In turn, the way a product is transported 
determines the time it takes to get a product from source to user. Storage is also 
time and space dependent. Very few products are manufactured in lots of one. 
The output of production runs becomes inventory which must be stored at 
various locations before reaching the ultimate user. These warehouses or stock 
points (including weapons armories) are important because they affect the rate of 
technology proliferation. 
Companies that wish to engage in an export strategy must coordinate the 
activities of a number of secondary actors such as banks, insurance companies, 
various governmental agencies (e.g., Customs and Commerce), shippers, and 
carriers.62 Each of these actors has specific requirements that must be satisfied 
before product transfer occurs. Requirements can become so complex that many 
62Magee, Copacino, and Rosenfeld, p. 195. 
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corporations rely on companies that specialize in facilitating the export/import 
process. Freight forwarders, for example, are involved in all aspects of planning 
and conducting the international shipment of goods from a product's source to 
its final destination. They help arrange for the most cost effective physical 
movement of exports as well as assist in completing important transportation 
documentation.63 A general appreciation of the actors and activities of the 
physical distribution system will enable an analyst to tap into the flows of 
information that control and record the material movement of technology 
products.64 Figure 2 depicts a generalized physical distribution subsystem. 
Many of the critical nodes, consolidation points, and bottlenecks of the value 
system occur in the physical distribution system. By concentrating on these 
potential logistics vulnerabilities, analysts can determine specific points at which 
leverage can be applied to influence a malignant market. For instance, the time 
it takes to deliver a product from port A to port B provides a window of 
opportunity for interdiction. Secondary actors can provide information on the 
specifics of past shipments or serve as the focal point for economic sanctions or 
63Functions include: cargo consolidation, booking space on 
ships, preparing export declarations, import permits, commercial 
invoices, consular invoices, bills of lading, certificates of 
origin, insurance, and collecting payments for shipments. 
Magee, Copacino, and Rosenfeld, p. 196. 
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diplomatic protest.65 And, when military force is being considered as an option, 
warehouses represent prime targets. 
H. CONCEPT OF CONTROL AND DEPENDENCY 
System actors control the process of technology proliferation. The actors 
decide the type, quantity, quality, method, and timing of the proliferation process. 
As the number of actors increase, power is diffused, making the system more 
difficult to control internally and more complicated structurally. These actors 
have various degrees of control depending on their position within the system. 
The primary actors, USERs, manufacturing SOURCEs, and SUPPLIERs, are critical 
to system operation and therefore have the greatest influence. Secondary actors 
are associated with the physical distribution process. They are vital to the system 
but they depend on, and are constrained by, decisions of the primary actors. 
Tertiary actors are governments whose main function is regulation rather than 
control of the technology proliferation process. Governments react to decisions 
by the primary actors.66 
65Companies as the focal point of diplomatic protest is not a 
new idea. Recently the U.S. government filed a protest with 
Thailand over the activities of one of its companies in Libya. 
66 In government owned industries or centrally controlled 
economies, governments function as primary actors. 
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I. SUMMARY 
In light of the changing geostrategic landscape and recent U.S. initiatives, the 
process of technology proliferation must be reevaluated. It is no longer valid to 
view technology proliferation as a byproduct of military and ideological conflict. 
Proliferation in the post-Cold War environment is largely a function of dynamic 
interactions betwee-1 ~orporate actors participating in highly competitive 
technology markets. By synthesizing aspects of several international business 
theories, a market model based on the legal, commercial aspects of technology 
proliferation can be developed. This model provides a visual representation of 
the technology proliferation process and provide a framework for proliferation 
intelligence efforts. 
The next section investigates sources of information and collection 
techniques that are used in customizing the generic technology proliferation 
market model into a product specific one. 
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III. SOURCES AND COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
The Intelligence Community's current challenge is to expand the use of open 
sources to cover a broader range of issues such as weapons proliferation, 
economic competitiveness and the environment. 
Admiral William Studemann 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence67 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The economic questions raised in the analysis of technology proliferation 
markets cannot be answered merely through a realignment of the technical and 
human assets that served the intelligence community well in the past. New 
sources of information must be found and exploited. Decision makers need to 
develop an appreciation for the value of these new sources and analysts must be 
trained in effective collection techniques. This chapter describes open sources and 
explains how open source information can be applied to the problem of 
technology proliferation. One open source of information that is uniquely 
designed for the investigation of proliferation markets, commercial computerized 
databases, is examined in detail. Techniques to exploit this potential source of 
intelligence are also introduced. 
67Studemann, .~dmiral William, "Teaching The Giant To Dance: 
Contradictions and Opportunities in Open Source Withi~ the 
Intelligence Community". Unpublished paper presented at the First 
International Symposium on National Security and National 
Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions, December 1992. 
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B. OPEN SOURCES 
In an era of declining defense budgets, new sources of intelligence 
information must be both affordable and currently available. Requests for the 
development and acquisition of unique hardware systems or the procurement and 
integration of unproven software programs are unlikely to be greeted with much 
enthusiasm or funding. These fiscal constraints, however, may turn out to have 
the positive consequence of forcing a complete evaluation of the intelligence 
potential of open sources. 
A leading proponent of using open sources for intelligence applications, 
Robert Steele, defines them as information sources that are "not classified at their 
origin, are not subject to proprietary constraints other than copyright, are not 
produced by sensitive contacts requiring obscuration and are not acquired 
through clandestine or covert means."68 By definition, open sources contain 
neither classified military nor proprietary corporate information nor does their 
exploitation constitute industrial espionage. Open sources are particularly suited 
to an investigation of technology proliferation markets because international 
business is a relatively transparent endeavor compared to intelligence collection 
tasks of the past. 
Bureaucratic inertia, the inability of large organizations to change rapidly 
enough to conform to contemporary requirements, may hinder acceptance of open 
68Steele, Robert D., "Open Source Intelligence Clarifies Global 
Threats," Signal, September 1992. 
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sources as an intelligence tool on a par with classified sources and methods. 
Interestingly, this inertia may be more psychological than structural. The use of 
open sources requires a fundamentally different approach toward and attitude 
about the intelligence cycle69 than is used when exploiting classified sources. 
1. Historic Uses of Open Sources 
Open sources were not used extensively in the past because of the 
nature of the Cold War threat. Hostile target nations were characterized by 
closed societies in which public and published data were controlled by 
centralized, totalitarian governments. These governments were supported by 
extensive internal security organizations whose modus operandi was 
disinformation, both for foreign and domestic consumption. The nature of these 
target countries lead to the development of collection strategies geared to 
uncovering their "secrets."70 In this "data poor environment," large amounts of 
time, effort, and money were required to uncover small amounts of usable 
intelligence. 
69The intelligence cycle is the process by which information 
is acquired, converted to finished intelligence and made available 
to policy makers. Richelson, Jeffry T., The U. S. Intelligence 
Community 2nd ed., p. 3, Harper Business, 1989. 
70Admiral William Studemann, "Teaching the Giant to Dance: 
Contradictions and Opportunities in Open Source Within the 
Intelligence Community." 
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The need to maintain intelligence capabilities suited to a data poor 
environment has not disappeared.71 However, most societies today are 
characterized by a combination of both open and closed segments. This is 
increasingly true of those countries which do not threaten the United States 
directly but retain the capability to do so, such as Russia and China. Therefore, 
in addition to the traditional intelligence sources and techniques used to collect 
secret information, open sources and techniques must be developed to allow 
threat analysis of the open aspects of adversarial societies. 
When using open sources and techniques, the activities of the 
intelligence cyclen are conducted in a "data rich environment." The analysis 
problem in this type of collection environment consists of sorting through, and 
making sense of vast quantities of information in a timely manner. 
Disinformation is less likely because of the decreased desire and ability of a 
government to conduct a coordinated campaign. The problem of misinformation 
however, data that is partially or totally incorrect but not part of a planned 
coordinated strategy, still exists. An open source strategy must necessarily 
incorporate methods to mitigate this problem.73 
71Countries such as North Korea and Iraq very much fit the 
closed country mold and remain the United States' most visible 
threats. 
72 Planning and direction, collection, processing , production 
and analysis, and dissemination. Richelson, p. 3. 
73 Such as by verification through multiple sourcing. 
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2. The Nature of Open Sources 
The concept of exactly what constitutes an open source has changed 
dramatically over the past few years. As late as 1989, Jeffry Richelson, a noted 
author on intelligence organizations, described open sources as "newspapers, 
magazines, and unclassified journals as well as public radio and television."74 
His examples of open source applications highlight their severe limitations during 
the Cold War.75 Just three years after Richelson's book was published, Admiral 
William Studemann, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, presented a paper 
before the First International Symposium on National Security and National 
Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions in which he addressed the increasing 
utility of exploiting open sources to answer qualitatively new questions being 
posed to the intelligence community. He significantly expanded Richelson's 
definition to include "printed material such as books, magazines, and newspapers 
as well as maps, photographs, data files, digital imagery and broadcast media. "76 
The utility of open sources ha~ jeen enhanced not only by recent 
geostrategic changes but by the evolution of information technology. Over the 
74Richelson, p. 250. 
750pen sources permitted the identification of Yuri Andropov 
as the person chosen to lead Brezhnev's funeral procession. 
Deductive analysis of that bit of data led Kremlinologists to 
predict that Andropov would follow Brezhnev as Soviet Chairman. 
Richelson, p. 253. 
76Admiral William Studemann, "Teaching the Giant to Dance: 
Contradictions and Opportunities in Open Source Within the 
Intelligence Community." 
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past decade, advances in microelectronics have allowed greater and greater 
amounts of information to be stored in increasingly smaller physical space. 
Software developments facilitated the growth of the personal computer industry 
by making computers "user friendly." This encouraged the development of 
computer applications in disciplines other than the computing sciences.77 The 
invention of supporting systems such as modems has allowed the rapid 
transmission of data over installed telephone lines. New hardware (e.g., text 
scanners) and processes (e.g., photocomposition) permit tremendous volumes of 
textual material, such as books, periodicals, and newspapers to be easily placed 
in computerized format. Digitization, storing information in binary code (i.e., on 
a laser disc) as opposed to storing information in electric fields (i.e., on magnetic 
tape), affects information storage, retrieval and transfer in ways which are just 
beginning to be realized. The planned replacement of current telephone lines 
with fiber optic cable will provide even greater impetus to the information 
revolution by allowing the transfer of text, sound, and images at the same time. 78 
CD-ROM is the Model-T Ford of this multiple medium industry. 
In the post Cold War world, the Intelligence Community is not 
responding to traditional country threats (e.g., USSR) but to a threat environment 
(e.g., weapons proliferation, general instability). Part of this threat environment 
77Those based on mathematics and physics. 
78See Ramirez, Anthony, "A War Within a Single Wire," The New 
York Times, p. C-1, 27 October 1993, for an indication of future 
practical applications of telecommunications technologies. 
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is characterized by an opening of societies, greater information flow, and new 
technologies that allow the exploitation of open sources in ways which were 
never before possible. 
C. COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED DATABASES 
The most promising open source for the study of proliferation markets is 
commercial computerized databases. The exploitation of these databases will not 
make technology tracking easy, but it will make monitoring possible. There 
remains a great deal of confusion and skepticism regarding the utility of 
commercial databases as an intelligence source and the applicability of computers 
to non-computing problems. It is therefore necessary to examine exactly what a 
commercial computerized database is, how it differs from other databases, what 
role the computer plays, and why this open source is useful in customizing 
proliferation market models. 
1. Database 
A database, very simply, is a means by which information is organized 
and stored. While databases can consist of many different types of information, 
for example words, numbers, images, and sounds,79 it is the textual databases, 
those containing words, which are used in this current project. Although use of 
the term "database" implies "computerized," theoretically speaking, a database can 
79Williams, Martha E., "The State of Databases Today: 1993" 
Gale Directory of Databases, p. xxi, Gale Research Inc. January 
1993. 
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exist without a computer. A paper filing system is an example of an elementary 
"database." As used here, databases are filing systems that have evolved in the 
age of computers. 
Databases can be maintained in two ways, locally or remotely. A local 
database is one in which the user collects, organizes, updates, and retrieves 
information according to its specific needs. A company's personnel files are an 
example of a local database. The contents of a local database are not limited, 
however, to internal information. External information, such as might be 
collected by a company's marketing division, can also be part of a local database. 
Because they control the entire process, users are more familiar with, and have 
greater confidence in, local databases. A remote database is one in which 
information collection, organization, and maintenance are performed by someone 
other than the user. The user, therefore, has no control over the contents of the 
database. The user gains access rights to the information contained in the remote 
database by contracting with a commercial supplier.80 
One can begin to appreciate the volume of material contained in 
databases after citing some relevant statistics. Martha Williams notes that the 
number of databases has doubled in t..'1e past five years to over 7000. This 
80 There are remote databases that contain public information, 
such as those on the INTERNET, but their evaluation and use is 
beyond the scope of this report. 
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represents 4.527 billion database records each of which contains 200-2000 words. 
For comparison, this page of typed text contains just over 200 words.81 
These statistics are impressive, but are only important if the databases 
provide information that facilitates the modeling of proliferation markets. In fact, 
the majority of databases do just that by providing a wealth of information on 
specific companies, the technology patents which they hold, their marketing 
strategies, and even data concerning contract negotiations.82 Many other 
databases also have potential direct application. For instance, those containing 
bibliographic data and news stories allow the analysts to tap into information 
which has already undergone some preliminary analysis. 
2. Computers 
Computers enhance the use of databases by providing the physical 
means by which this vast amount of information can be manipulated. They do 
this in several ways. First, computers make databases easier to develop and 
maintain by permitting large amounts of data to be placed rapidly in common 
formats such as lists or files. Secondly, they allow this data to be arranged and 
rearranged in innumerable ways, permitting the creation of information products 
81Tracking technology is only one application of database 
exploitation. Because databases are expanding exponentially and 
database search skills are not part of most analysts tool kit, an 
almost untapped source of potential intelligence inf orrnation 
currently exists. This source and the skills necessary to exploit 
~-t constitute a new field: Database Intelligence (DBINT). 
82Williarns, p. xx 
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tailored to meet specific needs. Finally, and most importantly, computers permit 
a user to_ ~ccess rapidly and sort through the vast amount of information that 
databases provide. 
It is important to understand what roles computers are not playing in 
this investigation of proliferation markets. Computers are not performing 
calculations. There are no algorithms (formulas) being used that allow questions 
to be posed, computations to be performed, and answers about the proliferation 
process to be derived. Neither are computers being used here in conjunction with 
Decision Support Systems (DSS). DSSs use artificial intelligence to assess and 
compare the variables of complex problems to determine the "best" course of 
action. While it is true that computers can and are being used by various 
intelligence agencies in the above modes to conduct multivariate trend and threat 
analysis, they are used in this project for data retrieval only. 
In this application, information is stored on computers in databases 
that are remotely maintained. Access to this information is legally gained by 
contracting with a database company. Information is physically extracted or 
pulled from the database by using a password supplied by the company, a 
personal computer equipped with a modem, and a printer. The information thus 
retrieved constitutes raw data. The value of this data is not a function of 
computer hardware or software but is dependent on the skills and insight of the 
analyst. Computers, therefore, neither substitute for analysis nor displace the 
analyst. On the contrary, computers increase the need for systematic methods of 
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evaluating large quantities of very different types of information and put a 
premium on the skills and work of educated, and highly motivated, analysts. 
3. Commercial 
Commercial databases are particularly well suited for the investigation 
of proliferation markets for several reasons. First, commercial databases are 
geared toward business applications. Of the 7841 entries listed in the 1993 edition 
of Gale's Directory of Databases, 4116 (53 percent) relate to business, science, 
technology and engineering.8.3 Second, databases are expanding in scope to 
provide potential information on global proliferation activities and actors. In fact, 
the only continent that is not specifically covered by a database is Antarctica.84 
Third, competition is forcing the database industry to respond to user demands, 
making databases more accessible to the general public. 
Buying access to commercial databases is cost effective because of the 
amount of information that they contain. Since these databases are remotely 
maintained, the costs in manpower, time, and money associated with computer 
hardware, database development and maintenance85 are borne by the database 
producer. Also, commercial databases fees are not based on constant rents but 
on the amount of time a user is actually looking for, retrieving or extracting 
83Williams, p. xxv. 
84Williams, p. xxiii. 
0
"Updating a database to keep it comprehensive and current. 
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information.86 This pay-as-you-go aspect is particularly attractive during a 
period of fiscal constraint. 
Because there are over 7000 commercial databases, it is difficult to 
know which ones contain specific data applicable to a particular product market. 
Database vendors partially solve this problem by providing access to many 
databases at the same time. For example, for a minimal fee87 the DIALOG 
vendor service allows access to over 450 databases. DIALOC recently entered 
into an agreement with a second vendor service, DATASTAR, which expands the 
available access to over 525 databases. DATASTAR is known for its 
comprehensive coverage of European corporations. DIALOG/DATASTAR was 
selected for this study because it is a currently existing source at both the Naval 
Postgraduate School and at various intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED DATABASES 
The two greatest limitations associated with commercial computerized 
database exploitation are the inability to access fully all material referenced on 
certain databases and the fact that they are not all standardized in a "user 
friendly" format. The first limitation relates to the database entries themselves. 
86The information on databases can be stored on magnetic tapes 
or compact discs (CD-ROM) and mailed to the user. This method has 
some cost advantages such as no online or download fees. However, 
the disadvantages are that the information may be old, only one 
database can be accessed at a time, and each database must be 
purchased separately. 
87 $295. 00 
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Not all databases contain entire books, articles, or papers. Instead, they provide 
short abstracts of the information contained in these documents and a 
bibliographic reference as to where the articles can be found. Complete entries 
known as "full text," are becoming increasingly common and, undoubtedly, will 
someday be the standard.88 Until then, an analyst must have access to a well 
stocked research library. 
The second limitation relates to what is known in computer circles as the 
"user-interface." Many analysts and researchers who could potentially use these 
databases are either not aware of their existence or know that pertinent 
information exists but do not have the time, inclination or opportunity to learn 
how to use them.89 Databases and the computers on which they are stored, are 
research tools and, like any tool, require a certain degree of skill to use. To 
effectively locate and retrieve .information, a researcher must have some 
familiarity with a computer keyboard and an understanding of the fundamentals 
of word processing.90 More importantly though, a researcher must develop a 
familiarity with the contents of the databases being exploited. 
88Currently, full text is available on 50% of all conunercial 
databases. Williams, p. xx. 
89Based on an informal survey of professors at NPS. 
90In fact, excessive preoccupation with developing computer 
competency tends to shift the focus of the analyst away from the 
potential of the information and toward the potential of the 
hardware. 
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Databases contain different types of data and often require slightly different 
methods of retrieval for each type of information. The database industry is 
attempting to standardize these retrieval methods, but is being hindered by the 
industry's explosive growth. Generally speaking, access is gained to the 
information in the database by conducting a series of steps on the computer 
keyboard known as access protocols. By conforming to these protocols, the 
researcher is speaking the database language and can therefore communicate 
specific requests for information. This skill requires an inquisitive attitude, and 
the ability to read and understand instructions related to general computer 
software commands. It is best honed with practice, but a great deal can be 
learned away from the computer through literature provided by commerrial 
dctabase companies and/ or specialized magazines such as Database and Online. 
This requirement for specific skills highlights a related limitation, the 
dependence on intermediaries. Most people with the skills necessary to exploit 
databases are not the people who fully understand the requirements and goals of 
the research being conducted. These intermediaries, in the form of research 
librarians and/ or private companies specializing in information retrieval, 
currently serve as a necessary link between the information source and 
information user. They may also serve, however, as a buffer and unintentional 
filter through which information must pass. This filtering can dilute the utility 
of the information and the effective use of databases in general. 
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Currently, most analysts determine what to look for while intermediaries 
determine where and how to look for the information. It is helpful if the 
intermediary knows something about the subject under investigation, but this is 
not always possible. The analyst requesting specific information is, therefore, 
limited by his or her ability to explain the nature of the research to the 
intermediary and by the intermediary's knowledge, skill and motivation. The 
potential of commercial computerized databases as an intelligence source will not 
be realized until the researcher I analyst develops the necessary skills to displace 
intermediaries and thereby decrease the effects of filtering. 
Even with these limitations, commercial computerized databases represent 
a unique collection environment that provides information well suited to the task 
at hand. The remainder of this section identifies techniques to retrieve 
information pertinent to proliferation markets. These techniques can be used 
directly by an analyst or can be explained to and performed by an intermediary. 
E. TECHNIQUES TO EXPLOIT COMMERCIAL COMPUTERIZED 
DATABASES 
The process of finding and retrieving information from databases is called 
"searching." The most important aspect of database exploitation is the 
development of a clear, concise search strategy. Effective strategies are critical to 
cost and time efficient use of databases. Search strategies consist of three parts: 
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identifying the pertinent type of data; identifying the data's location; and 
determining how to retrieve it. 
To know exactly what information is needed, an analyst must have some 
expertise on the subject in question. This can be accomplished by consulting 
known "experts" or conducting substantive research prior to going "on line" (the 
term used to describe time actually spent connected to the database). This 
expertise helps define the precise key terms, or word combinations required for 
an effective search. 
The second part of the search strategy is knowing where the greatest 
potential exists for finding the type of information being sought. Each search 
strategy will be somewhat unique, requiring access to different combinations of 
databases. This requires some familiarization with the content of the database. 
The third part of the strategy involves certain techniques that affect how the 
information is retrieved. These techniques consist of a combination of keywords 
and search options provided by installed "correlation" software. Some techniques 
being developed by corporations to enhance their competitivenes~ in domestic 
and international markets can be adapted to the modeling of proliferation 
markets. The~ business techniques will be used in conjunction with the 
development of new techniques that fit the specific needs of the project. 
1. Searching: An Iterative Process 
Searching the computerized database for information to customize a 
specific proliferation market model is an iterative process. Initially, a general 
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search should be conducted to determine the amount (i.e., number of articles or 
"hits"), ~~ kind (e.g., historical records, technical reports) and the location (i.e., 
which databases) of available information. Since the market model is product 
specific, an initial general search strategy would begin by determining the 
keywords and phrases associated with the selected product. 
Search strategies require that requests for information be framed in 
terms of Boolean, AND/OR/NOT, logic. Boolean logic "translates" a research 
question into a format that the computer understands. Computers will only 
recognize combinations of terms already programmed into the database software. 
While seemingly simple, Boolean logic can be frustrating, especially for an an111yst 
deeply involved in research. Very early on, a researcher internalizes basic 
assumptions regarding the research. These assumptions must be "explained" to 
the computer. 
For example, the case study for this project was conducted by a naval 
officer searching for information on a specific electronic component associated 
with mines. A logical initial keyword, therefore, would be "mines." If this 
keyword was used, however, a great deal more information would be extracted 
than desired. For instance "mines" would retrieve database entries on gold mines, 
strip mining, and even black lung disease (disease, mine). This spurious 
information costs both money and time and is an example of the pitfalls of a 
faulty search strategy. Table IV displays some keyword combinations that would 
result in some spurious information. 
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Once the proper combination of keywords and phrases is discovered, 
synonyms must be investigated. As noted before, not all databases are 
standardized. Terms used to access the same type of data may vary slightly from 
database to database. For example, "mine parts" could be listed as "accessories," 
"components," or "upgrades." Table V lists some possible combinations of 
KEYWORD SPURIOUS INFO 
MINES GOLD MINES 
MILITARY MINES LAND MINES 
UNDERWATER MINES SEA BED MINING 
NAVAL MINES PARTIAL INFORMATION 
TABLE IV: Ke yw ords 
"ANI>" Logic Mines AND Mines AND Mines AND 
Naval Underwater Marine 
"OR" Logic Mines AND Sea 
OR Acoustic 
OR Pressure 
"NOT" Logic Mines AND 
Naval NOT 
Land 
TABLE V: ANI>/OR/NOT Logic 
keywords and phrases associated with the case study. 
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Fortunately, when dealing with manufactured products, there is a short 
cut in the_ ~e of Boolean logic. Manufactured products are grouped by industrial 
or "product codes." These codes are based one of three industrial classification 
systems: the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC},91 Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC}, or Harmonized System (HS). SIC has traditionally 
been the most important because it is "the classification standard underlying all 
establishment based U.S. economic statistics classified by industry.'192 
SIC based product codes are two to seven digit numerical codes which 
indicate two things. The numbers themselves indicate different products in 
various industries. The amount of digits in the number indicates the degree of 
aggregation of the products within an industry. As the number of digits increase, 
the code indicates a much narrower range of products. An example of SIC based 
product codes is shown below. 
The level of aggregation that a searcher chooses will depend on the 
product being investigated or the iteration of the search. When tracking specific 
technology products it is appropriate to use the greatest level of disaggregation; 
the seven digit product code. This level of aggregation is one or two levels above 
the optimum level for component tracking but does significantly reduce the 
volume of information that must be evaluated. 
91Executive Office of the President, Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual 1987, Office of Management and Budget. 









SIC BASED PRODUCT CODES 
Level Description 
Major Groups Manufacturing 
Major Group Fabricated Metal Products 
Industry Group Ordnance and Accessories 
Industry Ammunition, except for 
Small Arms 
Bombs, mines, Product Class 
torpedoes and 
parts 
Marine Mines Product 
and Parts 
TABLE VI: Standard Industrial Classification Codes 
Because the codes are standardized, they always pertain to the same 
products. Fortunately product codes are one way in which many databases can 
be accessed. Finding and using the appropriate codes are the first steps to a 
successful search. SIC based product codes are listed in the Numerical List of 
Manufactured and Mineral Products published by the Bureau of Census and 
available through the U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Of the two other codes used in industrial circles, SITC can be 
discounted because it does not go below the four digit level of disaggregation. 
Codes based on the Harmonized System, are used in the classification of 
international products. This system was partially adopted by the United States 
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on January 1st, 1989 and is adhered to by 50 other industrialized countries.93 
Harmonized codes are much different than the SIC based ones. Since both codes 
are used in various databases, both must be known. The Harmonized System 
codes for this project's case study are listed below. 
HARMONIZED SYSTEM CODES 
9306 
Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, 
and similar munitions of war and parts 
thereof •. ~. 
9306.90.80.6 
Parts for bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines 
and similar munitions of war. 
TABLE VII: Harmonized System Product Codes 
Keeping in mind that information is being retrieved in relation to the 
proliferation model, a second search may focus on another element of the value 
system, such as the actors. Information should answer questions, such as where 
the source's factory is physically located and what is the manufacturing plant's 
production capacity. Is the company a multinational and if so, who are the 
company's foreign subsidiaries and parents? What patents does the company 
hold? What is the size of the companies export market? The information is 
inserted into the appropriate place in the model. As each new piece of 
93Department of Commerce, Lexicon of Trade Terms. 
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information is added, the model is customized to represent the actual market 
structure. 
2. When Can You Stop? 
Each iteration of the search allows a more specific investigation of an 
element in the model. Theoretically, iterative searching could continue until the 
research budget was exhausted, the information was so specific that no further 
data existed in the databases, or the model was a perfect representation of the 
actual market. In practice however, the number of searches will be limited by 
funding and the specific requirements of the originator. 
The investigation of proliferation markets will be conducted in 
response to specific requests for information from operators and/ or policy 
makers. Strategic concerns may be answered in the first few iterations if, for 
example, the request is to correlate actors with the countries in which they 
operate. H the model is being used to address tactical concerns, such as the 
location of the warehouses in which a specific product is stored, many iterations 
will be needed. These searches may not provide information specific enough for 
decision making, but can significantly narrow the intelligence collection "field of 
view" so that classified sources can be employed. The importance and true utility 
of this method exists as an augmentation to more traditional forms of intelligence 
collection and analysis. 
There is no way to determine if an analyst has extracted all the 
pertinent information relating to the market under investigation or how accurately 
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the model reflects the actual proliferation market structure. Success of the 
method is measured not in terms of how comprehensive the information is, but 
if, at the end of the evolution, more pertinent information exists than before. 
F. SUMMARY 
During the Cold War, open sources proved to be of limited use. Today, 
however, open sources can augment traditional assets and provide valuable 
intelligence data on some non-traditional threats facing the United States. Open 
sources are particularly useful for monitoring technology proliferation. 
Commercial computerized databases, because of their orientation toward business 
and industry, are open sources ideally suited to the investigation of technology 
proliferation markets. Since technology proliferation is largely a commercial 
exercise, techniques to exploit the capabilities of computerized databases can be 
borrowed from those used by corporate market analysts. The following section 
uses a case study to investigate the utility of the technology proliferation 
monitoring method. 
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IV. CASE STUDY 
The task of defining threat technologies - be it the most sophisticated anti-
ship missiles or the simplest of small arms and hand planted mines - is 
foremost." Office of Naval Intelligence 
Posture Statement, May 199394 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Previous sections of this report identified the threat posed by technology 
proliferation, established a theoretical foundation for the investigation of 
technology proliferation markets and explained how to use open sources and 
techniques to gather proliferation market intelligence. This section uses a case 
study to illustrate the general utility of the technology proliferation monitoring 
method. 
It is impractical to conduct an analysis of proliferation markets for every 
technology in every warfare area. Analysts must concentrate on high-tech 
products posing the most serious military threats. For the purpose of this report, 
high-tech components that can be used to enhance or upgrade the sophistication 
of a weapon or military system are termed "threat technologies." Threat 
technologies occur in every warfare area, from the "high end" to the "low end" of 
the military spectrum. For example, at the high end of the spectrum, near the 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threshold, the incorporation of satellite 
94Sheaffer, Radm Edward D., Office of Naval Intelligence 
Posture Statement, May 1993. 
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based, commercially available, GPS (Global Positioning System) technology into 
a ballistic missile's inertial navigation system significantly enhances the accuracy 
of that weapon system. At the low end of the spectrum, the incorporation of 
microcomputers and advanced passive sensor technology into the firing circuits 
of naval mines have changed these devices from relatively simple to smart 
weapons. The mine component that serves as the 'brain" for current generations 
of intelligent mines, the Target Detection Device (TDD), is the subject of this case 
study. 
B. MINE WARFARE: AN APPROPRIATE CASE STUDY 
Iraqi mining operations during the Gulf War raised concerns among civilian 
and military officials about the capabilities of U.S. mine warfare forces. During 
that conflict, mines severely damaged the USS Tripoli and USS Princeton. 
According to C'...eneral Walter Boomer, Commanding General of the First Marine 
Expeditionary Force during Operation Desert Storm, underwater mines were also 
a major consideration in the decision not to attempt an amphibious landing on the 
Kuwaiti coast.95 In light of these events, the Office of Naval Intelligence 
requested that research be conducted on the proliferation of technologies 
associated with mine warfare.% In response to this interest, this investigation 
95
"The Assault That Wasn It, n Nayy News and Undersea Technology, 
June 29, 1992. 
96Unclassif ied internal memorandum from Off ice of Naval 
Intelligence to National Security Affairs Department, Naval 
Postgraduate School, April 1993. 
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provides a strategic assessment of regional underwater mine markets as well as 
tactical intelligence to support "pro-active" mine countermeasures. The Mine 
Warfare Plan defines pro-active countermeasures as efforts aimed at "preventing 
the enemy from laying mines against U.S. and allied naval forces by destroying 
the mines at points of manufacture, storage, depots or during transport."97 
This case study also demonstrates the validity of the technology proliferation 
monitoring method developed in this report. Mine warfare clearly illustrates, in 
several respects, the changing nature of technology proliferation and the necessity 
of developing a fresh perspective on this potential threat. First, the United States 
does not maintain technological superiority in mines98 and is only now, after 
several decades of fiscal neglect, capable of fielding mine countermeasures forces 
technologically comparable to its NATO allies.99 U.S. mine inventories consist 
of weapons that currently lag several generations behind mines available on the 
international market. From a proliferation standpoint, since the United States 
does not produce or export current generation mines, national export controls 
97 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 39. 
98 While this mine inventory is not obsolete and the most 
sophisticated mines can be bought from NATO allies, the U. S. 
inventory will be severely depleted by the end of this decade. 
Foxwell, David, "Naval Mine Warfare: Unfunded and 
Underappreciated," p. 128, International Defense Review, Vol 2, 
1993. 
99MCM-1 Avenger class minesweepers and MHC-51 Osprey class mine 
hunters are outfitted with the world's most sophisticated mine 
countermeasures gear. 
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cannot be used to counter the spread of these weapons or their associated 
technologies. Even information about the size and scope of the market is 
difficult to obtain because the U.S. government is more likely to have information 
on a technology market in which U.S. companies are actively competing.100 
Second, the reorientation of the U.S. National Military Strategy from global 
to regional conflict and the concurrent shift of U.S. naval doctrine from open 
ocean to littoral warfare101 substantially increase the importance of amphibious 
and mine warfare in relation to other warfare areas. Mines are the weapon of 
choice for many developing countries and may, in a regional context, prove to be 
the ultimate conventional deterrent. John Mearsheimer defines conventional 
deterrence as "denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional 
forces."102 A review of mining operations conducted since wwn103 indicates 
that mines have been successful when used in this role. 
Third, the military-technological revolution is affecting the development of 
mines in ways that highlight the reasons why technology proliferation well below 
the Weapons of Mass Destruction threshold cannot be ignored. While the 
100The U. s. mine inventory consists principally of iron bombs 
converted into mines. 
101Uni ted States Department of the Navy, ... From the Sea: 
Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, Government 
Printing Office, September 1992. 
102Mearsheimer, John, Conventional Deterrence, p. 15, Cornell 
University Press, 1983. 
103Mine Warfare Plan, p. 18-24. 
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military-technological revolution is affecting both the mining and 
countermeasures aspects of mine warfare, the technology associated with mines 
is advancing more rapidly than mine countermeasures technology. Mine "counter 
countermeasures" such as intelligent hunter mines with "home on ping,"104 
severely complicate mine warfare operations and tactics. 
Finally, while the weapons themselves do not have dual use applications, 
this is not true of the components used to upgrade them. Target Detection 
Devices (TDD) for instance, combine tht' latest microprocessing computer 
technology with advances in passive sensor technology. 105 
C. OVERVIEW OF MINE WARFARE 
Mine warfare can be divided into two broad categories: mining and mine 
countermeasures (MCM). Mining encompasses all of the variables associated with 
placing an effective configuration of weapons in the water. Minefield location, 
geometry, weapons mix, and the best mine delivery method, must be determined. 
Mines can be used in accordance with an offensive or defensive strategy to deny 
access to harbors or coastal waters, to interrupt sea lines of communication 
(SLOC:s), or to delay the seaborne operations of an adversary (e.g., amphibious 
assault). The United States conducted a successful offensive strategy during the 
104 
"Mine Aimed at MCMV' s, " Jane's Defense Weekly, p. 95, May 
26, 1990. 
105Passive sensors are one of the critical technologies listed 
in chapter one p. 11. 
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Vietnam War when it mined Hiaphong Harbor and closed North Vietnam's most 
important port for 300 days.106 Successful defensive mining operations were 
most recently used during Operation Desert Storm. Iraq sewed ten minefields, 
consisting of 1100-1300 weapons, along the coast of Iraq and Kuwait that 
interrupted the naval operations of coalition forces and helped to deter an 
amphibious assault. 
There are two general types of mines that are designated in accordance with 
their method of actuation: contact or influence.107 Contact mines are usually 
tethered, or moored, to the seabed by cables or chains. They are detonated when 
a vessel physically comes into contact with horns protruding from the mine body. 
Influence mines can be either moored or designed to rest on the sea floor (also 
known as ground mines). They sense the magnetic, acoustic, and/or pressure 
signatures of a ship as the vessel moves through the water. The most 
sophisticated influPnce mines use combinations of magnetic, acoustic, pressure, 
and even seismic sensors to enhance both the sensitivity of the mine and its 
ability to discriminate between targets. 
The second major area of mine warfare is mine countermeasures (MCM). 
Mine countermeasures are designed to reduce the effectiveness of an adversaries 
1c6Hartmann, Gregory, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the 
U.S. Nayy, Naval Institute Press, 1979. 
io-:Specialty mines such as CAPTOR and modern hunter mines are 
a com~ination of mines and torpedoes. These hybrids use influence 
sensors and can be considered an evolution of the ground mine. 
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mine forces by preemptively destroying mines prior to their deployment in the 
water, finding and marking minefields so they may be avoided, or detonating 
mines in a controlled manner through sweeping or hunting. Moored mines can 
be neutralized through mechanical sweeping methods. Mine sweeping vessels or 
helicopters tow "sleds" through known or suspected minefields. This mechanical 
sweep gear cuts the mooring cables causing the inherently buoyant mines to float 
to the surface where they can be destroyed by small arms fire. Some influence 
mines can also be swept. Devices that generate simulated magnetic and/ or 
acoustic signatures cause mine detonation as they are towed or piloted through 
the water. Mine sweeping is the fastest way to clear a minefield but it is not 
effective against pressure actuated influence mines. These weapons must be 
hunted. Mine hunting consists of searching, detecting, and classifying mines so 
that they may be neutralized, one at a time, by divers or Remotely Operated 
Vehicles (ROV).108 
D. MINES AND THE MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 
Underwater mines and associated technology have traditionally been very 
slow both to develop and to become obsolete. Contact mine technology 
developed at the tum of the 20th century is still a viable threat on the eve of the 
108Increasingly, remotely operateu. vehicles such as the U.S. 
Navy's mine neutralization system {MNS) are being used in both mine 
sweeping and hunting. 
"Naval Mine Warfare Supplement," International Defense Review, p. 
10, 11/1989. 
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21st.109 The current weapon inventories of many Third World countries consist 
of mines produced shortly after World War 11.110 A review of the high-tech 
applications currently being incorporated into mines, however, indicates that 
mines are rapidly evolving into sophisticated weapon systems. Microprocessors, 
sonar systems, non-metallic construction materials, unique architectural designs, 
absorptive coatings, advanced sensors, anti-swimmer devices, remote actuation, 
and propulsion and guidance systems are being incorporated into the newest 
generations of mines. 
A related technological development of particular concern to those decision 
makers responsible for evaluating specific regional threats, is the introduction of 
modular upgrade kits that can be reterofitted to existing mine warstocks. These 
kits replace a mine' s firing circuits with modern electronics, turning relatively 
simple underwater ordnance into computer controlled, multiple sensor "smart" 
weapons. 
The ability to retrofit existing warstock mines with a microprocessing "brain" 
has several major implications for mine and littoral warfare. First, force packages 
and strategies used to counter mines depend on the type, (bottom, moored), the 
actuation device, (magnetic, acoustic, pressure), and mix of mines. Second, 
109In 1987 and 1988 respectively, the US flagged oil tanker 
Bridgeton and the USS Samual B. Roberts struck contact mines that 
were of pre-World War One design (Mk.08). 
110Jane's Undersea Warfare 1993-94, p. 170, Jane's Information 
Group Ltd. 1993. 
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external identification of the mine, required in mine hunting, is no longer a valid 
indicator of a mine' s capabilities. m Even contact mines can be upgraded into 
multiple sensor devices. Third, the purchase of TDD upgrades invalidates known 
mine orders of battle. 
These TDD upgrade kits are the specific threat technology being investigated 
by this study. They are a potential threat because they are currently being offered 
for export by several companies on the international market. If the proliferation 
market for these modular TDDs is modeled, therefore, it may provide information 
on the level of sophistication of mine inventories, previously purchased mines, or 
even an indigenous mine production capability.112 
E. CUSTOMIZING THE TDD PROLIFERATION MARKET MODEL 
The development of a threat technology market model must begin v.rith an 
investigation of the underwater mine market in general. This report uses the 
Mine Warfare Plan (MWP) as the starting point for this investigation. The MWP 
is useful for several reasons. First, the goal of this research is to add to the 
currently existing literature on the subject, not to repackage known information. 
The unclassified version of the MWP provides a benchmark against which open 
source information gathered by this method can be compared. Second, the MWP 
111Mine Warfare Plan, p. 31. 
112A country may have an indigenous, though relatively 
unsophisticated mi.ne production capability that can be upgraded 
with the TDD kit. 
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highlights those areas of mine warfare that need immediate attention, providing 
invaluable guidance for the selection of the threat technology. Finally the MWP 
is a contemporary document (published in 1992), that reflects post-Cold War 
thinking and incorporates the mine warfare lessons learned from Operation 
Desert Storm. It successfully serves as a primer on the current condition of U.S. 
mine warfare and its requirements for the future. 
1. The Mine Market 
The MWP approaches the threat posed by underwater mine 
proliferation from the aspect of national mine production and export activity. It 
states that "21 countries are known to produce mines and 13 are confirmed mine 
exporters." Only 16 of these mine producing countries are cited in the MWP, 
















TABLE VIII: Mine Producing 
Countries(Source: Mine Warfare 
Plan) 
It is interesting to note that 11 of the 16 nations are either allies or have 
a neutral foreign policy in regard to the United States. Of the others, one 
(Yugoslavia) no longer exists as a nation-state, two (Russia and China) have 
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improving relations with the United States, and another (Iraq) is currently 
controlled by UN sanctions and forces. At this time there is only one country, 
North Korea that produces mines, is hostile to the United States, and is insulated 
from U.S. influence. 
By including non-enemies in its survey, the MWP highlights one of the 
unique aspects of post-Cold War threat evaluation. The national security 
establishment can no longer focus on potentially hostile nations exclusively but 
must contend with potentially hostile environments. Any actor operating in this 
hostile environment must be evaluated. This entails breaking traditional taboos 
against collecting intelligence on U.S. friends and allies.113 Ironically, those 
actors who are most ardently pursuing capitalism generate the most concern in 
a proliferation environment dominated by financial rather than ideological 
motivations. U.S. allies or U.S. based firms, therefore, may contribute to this 
hostile environment in the future. 
Export controls cannot be relied upon to counter the proliferation 
threat. Multilateral controls are being phased out in the COCOM countries and 
are weak unilateral regimes, if they exist at all, in the other producing countries. 
Russian Defense Ministry officials confirmed that there are no national controls 
on the sale of former Soviet military stockpiles. Export discretion is at the hands 
113 This can be accomplished without violating any laws or 
norms of international behavior by using open sources. 
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of "plant managers."114 If the primary motivation behind proliferation is 
financial gain, then an understanding of the business aspects of proliferation is 
needed to counter the threat. 
Proceeding from the assumption that proliferation is primarily a 
function of corporate not government activity, an attempt was made to determine 
which companies make up the mine industry. The following companies, 
compiled from a review of open source literature, are advertised producers of 
naval mines and parts or have been involved in some form of underwater mine 
production, including bidding for contracts, during the ten year period 1983-1993. 
(See Table VTII). 
Compiling lists of companies, however, does not go very far toward 
the goal of evaluating the threat posed by the proliferation of mines and their 
associated technologies. It is much more helpful to know how these companies 
are related to one another in the context of the global underwater mine market. 
The list in table three includes competitors, subsidiaries, subcontractors, suppliers, 
as well as companies related to each other through joint ventures and co-
production agreements. Defining these companies as actors, and placing them in 
their correct relative position in a mine proliferation market model, is the first 
step in the procedure to monitor proliferation. 
114Interview with Dr. Vitaly Shylkov, Counselor to the 
Russian Ministry of Defense, at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 1993. 
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TABLE IX: Mine Producing Companies. (Primary Sources: Aero and Defense Markets 
Database, Jane's :Z:nternatnl Defense Directory 90, Jane's Underwater Weapons Systems 
1993-94.) 
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A preliminary analysis of this data set indicates that viewing mine 
production solely as the activity of a nation-state produces a somewhat 
misleading picture of the industry. For instance, the SM G2 ground mine is 
considered a product of Germany, but, in fact, is a product of 13 German and 
Danish companies whose prime contractor, Krupp-Atlas Electronic, is a 
multinational corporation headquartered in Germany. Another example is 
"Spanish" mine production. The French company Thomson CSF, through foreign 
investment, owns a 49 per cent share of the Spanish company EESA115 and 
therefore has considerable influence over the company's activities. 
Monitoring the proliferation of the weapon system using the modeling 
method is somewhat easier than the stated goal of this project: monitoring the 
technologies. In order to prove the utility of the method at this more difficult 
level of analysis, a subset of the above list is selected, i.e., those companies that 
are involved in the proliferation of Target Detection Devices. 
2. TDD Market 
A summary of the logic used to determine the threat 
technology is displayed in Table X. Specific information that is useful in 
WARFAREAREA -.MINE WARFARE 
SUB-;AREA OF··coNCERN - .MINING CAPABILITY 
TECHN~ :c~~E~~--T=Ts=~~ION DEVICES 
TABLE X: Investigation Logic 
115Foxwell, p. 129. 
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customizing the TDD proliferation market model must now be found. The 
search techniques used are based on an assumption that the needed information 
does exist in databases and that the only obstacle to information retrieval is 
asking the right questions. The goal of this exercise is determining who are the 
actors (sources and users) and how technology proliferates within the market. 
Any information concerning the four major elements of the model (i.e., actors, 
industrial activities, corporate strategies, or distribution channels) will help 
customize the model. The list of questions that served as guideposts for this 
investigation is shown below. 
QUSSfto.& '!'DT mn '1'C> m-nc:a l'llOIXJC'1'8 or xana:cn 
(1) Bow i• ~ proa.act refezze4 to la ~ lit:e.rat:u.re? 
(2) Ar. t:'bel:e cliffueDt: -. for ~ ._ it:-? 
(3) Doea it _._ a specliie oode (8%C, BCC). 
(.&) llJs&t: i• ~ .code moet: cloaely a..ociat:ecl wit:ll it:? 
(5) :t• it: adoNrt:Ued? 
(6) 1fllo .... it? 
<7> no are~ foreip affiliat:-/n!aeicliarl- of~ proiSuci.DtJ CG111p&Di .. t npplie.r•? 
nlx=oDt.ractors? 
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~t:.. (llUllH?). 
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(15) :t• t'bel:e ~ special paperwork tbat: mut be Hle4 for t:U t:r&Jul&ct:icm? 
TABLE XI: Investigation Questions 
Of the companies listed in table three above, there are three that are 
advertised as exporters of TDD upgrade kits: Whitehead Motofides, British 
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Aerospace, and Dalian Shipbuilding.116 Northbend Instruments produces a 
modular TDD that can be exported as a separate module.117 Inisel produces the 
electronics for the MOM-90 mine including the microprocessor controlled 
TDD.118 Krupp-Atlas Electronik produces the TDD for the SM-G2 ground 
mine.119 
F. SUMMARY 
It is impractical to monitor the proliferation patterns of every technology. 
Analysts must concentrate on "threat technologies," i.e., those technologies that 
directly challenge the superiority of existing military weapons and systems. 
Underwater mine upgrade kits are examples of a high technology application that 
enhances the military sophistication of a weapon. 
Mines are a low cost, conventional deterrent that may prove decisive to the 
outcome of limited regional or littoral warfare. The ability to upgrade existing 
warstock mines to microprocessor controlled, multiple sensor, "smart weapon" 
systems significantly alters the calculus used to plan certain military operations. 
116Jane's Underwater Weapon Systems, 1993-94. 
117Foxwell, p. 126. 
118
"Inisel Develops New Spanish Mine," Naval Forces, p. 
104, Vol. 10 No. 4, November 04, 1989. 
119
"Atlas Electronik - SM G2 Sea Ground Mine, "Maritime 
Defense, May 1992, pp. 126-129. 
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The degree to which these upgrade kits pose a threat can be evaluated by 
investigating the market for these Target Detection Device (TDD) upgrade kits. 
Proliferation intelligence for the TDD upgrade kit focuses on the source of 
the devices, companies legally pursuing profitable international business 
opportunities. The mine industry is characterized by a limited number of 
suppliers, that is, it is highly concentrated. The highly concentrated nature of the 
industry is even more prevalent when looking at TDDs. Although many of the 
companies participating in the TDD market are headquartered in countries that 
are traditional U.S. friends and allies, every actor within the market must be 
evaluated without prejudice. 
This case study reflects the first iteration of the investigation of the TDD 
market. With adequate time, financial support, and the appropriate level of 
interest, the technology monitoring method developed in this thesis can provide 
usable proliferation intelligence not only on mines but on technologies across the 




Secretary of Defense Aspin has designated the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction as one of four dangers to U.S. national security in the post Cold 
War world.120 The U.S. government intends to combat this threat on a "wide 
variety of fronts: policy; weapons acquisition; intelligence; analytical capabilities; 
export controls; and international political regimes."121 
This thesis addresses the changing nature of proliferation and focuses on the 
most problematic aspect of the threat: technology proliferation. Since technology 
is not yet fully integrated into the proliferation agenda, this technology 
monitoring method can compliment and strengthen the government's 
proliferation policy. 
There are two unique aspects to this monitoring method. First, it 
concentrates on the commercial aspects of proliferation. Second, it relies 
exclusively on open sources. 
120Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, The Bottom Up Review: 
Forces for a New Era, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
September 01, 1993. 
inAspin, Les, The Clinton Defense Plan, Secretary of 
Defense: Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
April, 01, 1993. 
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1. Implications of Proliferation Markets 
This monitoring method views technology proliferation as a systematic 
process. By understanuing the elements of the system and how the process 
works, a variety of options can be designed to counter technology proliferation. 
Most technology proliferation is inherently non-threatening or 'benign" 
from a military security perspective. Threats emerge from an environment in 
which the proliferation of technology may be detrimental to U.S. national 
interests. These threatening, "malignant," markets involve some combination of 
three elements: an inherently threatening technology; a technolL ;y user who has 
hostile intentions toward the United States; or a questionable proliferation pattern 
(e.g., an Iranian corporation's investment in the developing free market economies 
of Eastern Europe.) Benign markets may become malignant if, for example, 
intentions of the technology user change, or a new military ;::.!-'plication for a 
previously non-threatening technology is developed. 
The primary actors in technology markets are corporations rather than 
countries. Even in the case of technology procurement for national use, the 
proliferation occurs between state owned companies or, more frequently, 
companies under contract from a government. Maintaining a corporate level ot 
analysis allows the proliferation variables associate<l with Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs), such as licensing and foreign investment, to be 
incorporated into the method. 
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A different analytical perspective must be maintained also, because 
threat evaluation is conducted in an "environment" rather than on a traditional 
"enemy." Since unrestrained capitalism poses the greatest proliferation threat, 
analysts must think like capitalists and learn to appreciate financial vs ideological 
motivations for proliferation. Any actor operating in the threat environment is 
evaluated regardless of their national affiliation. This may include breaking the 
taboo against collecting intelligence on traditional friends and allies. The end 
product of this method is a model that provides a visual representation of a 
specific technology market. Once a malignant market has been identified, the 
model highlights specific market vulnerabilities such as dependence on foreign 
suppliers, production bottlenecks, and logistic chokepoints. It also makes 
apparent the specific points at which leverage (i.e., diplomatic request, political 
suasion, economic sanction, or military force) can be applied to the market in 
order to stop the proliferation. 
It is impossible to monitor all technologies at once. A limited number 
of technologies are especially threatening because they alter fundamentally the 
calculus used to determine the technological superiority of U.S. forces. 
Technologies associated with WMD are most often cited, but "threat technologies" 
exist across the spectrum of warfare. As used in this report, threat technologies 
are those associated with high-tech components that can be used to significantly 
enhance or upgrade the sophistication of a weapon or military system. 
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It is the nature of high-tech products, those that have a higher ratio of 
R&D expenditures to shipments, that many of their associated industries are 
characterized by very few producers, i.e., the industries are highly concentrated. 
This is clearly pointed out in a recent Wall Street Journal article entitled 
"Chokepoints- Computermakers Face Hidden Vulnerability: Supplier 
Concentration. "122 
The Japanese company Sumitomo Chemical suffered an explosion at its 
resin factory. This one factory was responsible for 65% of the resin necessary to 
seal computer microchips. The most interesting thing about the situation is that 
insiders to the industry were not aware of importance of the plant but also not 
surprised that these chokepoints existed. Industry is structured to be competitive, 
efficiency often means relying on single sources. H concentration is this severe 
at the industry level, it is probably mm~ so at the product level. 
Corporate actors conducting business inimical to the interests of the 
United States are vulnerable to different types of leverage than state actors. 
Domestic laws, multiple subsidiaries, and corporate image are variables unique 
to industry. Most corporations make many products. Pressure to change the 
marketing strategies for any one particular product may not be strongly opposed 
because of the potential negative consequences on the entire product line. The 
United States recently applied leverage to a Thai company that was building fall 
122Hamilton, David, P., "Chokepoints - Cornputermakers Face 
a Hidden Vulnerability: Supplier Concentration," p. 1, Wall 
Street Journal, 27 August 1993. 
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out shelters in Libya. A diplomatic protest from the U.S. government to the Thai 
government resulted in the investigation and ultimate arrest of the Thai 
construction company president for violating domestic employment laws.123 
This method is well suited to proactive, peacetime intelligence or 
collection during the pre-conflict stage of a crisis such as the six month prelude 
to the Gulf War, Operation Desert Shield. Specific information on the Iraq's 
French made air defense system, for example, could have been provided. A 
market model does not have to be completely customized to be useful. Partial 
models may provide the necessary data to interrupt the flow of threat 
technologies. The monitoring method can lJe triggered by other intelligence 
sources that indicate a benign market becoming malignant or, conversely, can be 
used to narrow the scope of the problem so that other intelligence assets can be 
brought to bear. 
2. Implication of the Use of Open Sources 
Commercial computerized databases are an open source, off-the-shelf 
resource that can be used to augment traditional assets conducting proliferation 
intelligence. To the extent that proliferation intelligence is economic intelligence, 
commercial computerized databases are uniquely optimized. 
A lot of time and effort has been devoted to building and maintaining 
database for intelligence purposes but there has been not much emphasis on the 
123Shenon, Philip, "Work by Thais in Libya Prompts a 
Warning by U.S.," The New York Times, 26 October 1993. 
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exploitation of databases produced by sources external to the national security 
community. The dynamism in both hardware and software technology is making 
databases easier to use and allowing vast amounts of information to be placed 
into computerized format. These advances have converged with profound 
geopolitical changes to make commercial computerized databases useful for 
solving many new problems and exploitable in ways that were never before 
possible. 
Commercial computerized databases are a product of the information 
revolution. They constitute some of the first paved stretches of the National 
Information Superhighway, and more importantly, are part of a rapidly 
developing global telecommunications/information network. Other applications 
of this global information network and its implications for national security are 
topics for future research. 
B. TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis uses open sources and applies business intelligence techniques 
to the problems associated with technology proliferation. Unfortunately, the 
thesis was able only to provide an introduction. The second, third and fourth 
iterations of the investigation of the Target Detection Device market were not 
accomplished due to time constraints. 
A proof of concept for this technology monitoring method is now required. 
It should take the form of a fully funded research project that responds to a 
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current technology proliferation threat. The project should include a clear means 
to determine the measure of effectiveness. Funding must be substantial enough 
to cover approximately four days of computer training in elementary through 
advanced database searching techniques, as well as all online and download fees 
associated with retrieving the information. Since it will provide the prototype for 
future research, allowance must be made for following and discounting "dead 
ends." 
This project uses a mine warfare case study in order to make the point that 
technologies below the WMD tlE-eshold cannot be ignored. This method, 
however, is applicable to all technologies, military, commercial, and dual-use, 
across the spectrum of warfare. 
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